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1In 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) made two important announcements.
First, it announced that the agency was holding its first major public meeting on FDA-
regulated products containing nanotechnology materials on October 10th in the
Washington, DC area. Second, FDA said that it had set up an internal task force to study
how to regulate nanotechnology products—focusing on understanding possible adverse
health effects from FDA-regulated nanotechnology products and addressing ways to close
any knowledge or policy gaps in this area.
Nanotechnology is the ability to do things—measure, see, predict and make—on a
scale of atoms and molecules, usually in the realm of 1-100 nanometers. A nanometer is
a billionth of meter and a human hair is about 100,000 nanometers in width. As FDA
noted in the announcement of its October meeting, due to their small size and extreme-
ly high ratio of surface area to volume, nanotechnology materials often have chemical,
physical or biological properties that are different from those of their larger counterparts.
Because of these novel properties, nanotechnology materials have great potential for use
in a vast array of exciting products. However, these special properties may also pose new
and different risks for humans and the environment.
According to Lux Research, the nanotechnology industry is expected to grow to $2.6
trillion in manufactured goods by the year 2014.1 It is a technology which promises to
change every facet of people’s lives—including important areas under FDA oversight: the
prescription drugs, medical devices and therapeutics people rely on; the food and dietary
supplements they eat; and the cosmetics they apply.The 2005 market size for nanotechnol-
ogy drug delivery systems alone is estimated at $980 million, and expected to grow 54%
annually over the next five years.2 Sales of nanotherapeutics, like nanosilver-based wound
dressings, were $28 million last year and are expected to increase every year by 62% through
2010.3 Food industry experts project that nanotechnology will be incorporated into $20 bil-
lion worth of consumer products globally by 2010.4
With government and industry investing billions of dollars a year in nanotechnology
R&D, the stakes involved in FDA “getting it right” in its oversight of nanotechnology are
high.The recent and critical assessment by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) of the American
drug safety system opened with a quote from business writer Matthew Herper, saying
“…FDA has become synonymous with drug safety. In a sense, ‘FDA approved’ is the brand
that the entire $216 billion U.S. drug market is founded upon. Dilute the confidence of the
public in the agency, and many billions of dollars in current and potential sales vanish
Foreword
1.The Nanotech Report 4th Edition. New York, NY: Lux Research, Inc., 2006, p. iii.
2.The Nanotech Report 4th Edition. New York, NY: Lux Research, Inc., 2006, p. 106.
3.The Nanotech Report 4th Edition. New York, NY: Lux Research, Inc., 2006, p. 124.
4.“Study: Nanotechnology in Food and Food Processing Worldwide 2003-2006-2010-2015.”Tübingen,
Germany: Helmut Kaiser Consultancy, 2006.Available at http://www.hkc22.com/nanofood.html, accessed
September 27, 2006.
2overnight.”5 The public will expect FDA to likewise ensure the safety of nanotechnology-
based products, and these products are already here.
Michael Taylor’s report, Regulating the Products of Nanotechnology: Does FDA Have the
Tools It Needs?, is an extremely important and thoughtful step in helping to ensure that
FDA has the strategy, expertise and resources it needs in the area of nanotechnology to
“get it right” now.
David Rejeski
Director, Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies
5. Institute of Medicine.The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public.
Washington, DC:The National Academies Press, 2006, p. 15.
3Nanotechnology is on its way to America’s supermarkets, drugstores, and hospitals, promis-
ing great benefits to consumers, patients and the economy. Like any new technology, how-
ever, the very properties that make nanotechnology different and exciting may pose safety
questions that society will demand be addressed.
And, so, nanotechnology is also on its way to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
– the 100-year-old public health institution on which Americans rely to ensure the safety of
many of the products to which nanotechnology is being applied, including cosmetics, foods
and food packaging, drugs, and medical devices.
FDA is not “nano ready.” This study asks whether FDA is ready, today, for the products
of nanotechnology. Does FDA have the tools it needs – legal, resource and scientific – to
oversee the introduction of nanotechnology in a way that meets public expectations?  The
short answer is, unavoidably, no. FDA is missing some of the legal tools it needs, but its readi-
ness for nanotechnology is most seriously hampered by the lack of resources required to
respond promptly to products in the market and in the development pipeline.
Gaps exist in FDA’s legal tool kit. FDA implements a venerable old consumer protec-
tion law, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic (FDC) Act, that has stood the test of time in
many respects and has retained its resilience through significant amendments since first being
enacted in 1938. Nanotechnology does reveal gaps in FDA’s legal tool kit.While there is not
a need to start from scratch in providing FDA the legal tools it require to regulate the prod-
ucts of nanotechnology, those gaps do need to be filled if FDA is to provide the oversight
people expect. The report analyzes the FDC Act with nanotechnology in mind, identifies
gaps, and recommends ways to close them.
FDA lacks necessary resources. The larger issue affecting FDA’s readiness for nanotech-
nology is resources. For the past decade or more, FDA’s resource base and overall capacity
have been eroded by the pressure of increasing demands and costs of doing business coupled
with the failure of Congress and successive administrations to adequately fund even base
operations. Just to be able to do what it was doing in 1996 and continue the new activities
mandated for it since then, FDA’s 2006 budget would have to be 49% greater than it is.
Under the President’s proposed 2007 budget for FDA, the funding gap between responsibil-
ities and capacity will grow again, to 56%.
This harsh budget reality is a real threat to FDA’s ability to effectively oversee nanotech-
nology. It means among other things that FDA lacks the resources it needs to build its own
expertise, to develop the safety-testing protocols and detection methods needed to evaluate
new nanotechnology products, to conduct its own risk research, to gather the necessary pre-
market data required to get ahead of commercialization and to oversee products after they
have entered the market.
The potential consequences of not adequately funding these FDA needs are at least
twofold. First, FDA may miss potential safety problems or discover them too late to pre-
vent harm, thereby jeopardizing public health and public confidence in nanotechnology.
Author’s Preface
4And second, FDA may lag in providing regulatory guidance and prompt regulatory reviews
to product developers, thereby impeding innovation that benefits all.
Neither outcome will be acceptable to the public at large or the regulated industry, but
FDA’s funding dilemma is stark: devoting resources to nanotechnology means taking
resources away from other programs and priorities. I hope the public interest and high stakes
surrounding nanotechnology will help prompt action to address FDA’s underlying budget
crisis. Society cannot fairly hold FDA accountable for delivering on the dual goals of ensur-
ing safety and fostering innovation if it withholds from FDA the means to do the job.
Even within its current authority and resources, FDA can and should take some immediate
steps to address the first wave of nanotechnology products now entering the market, including
perhaps the most fundamental one of setting the criteria for determining when a nanoscale
material is “new for legal and regulatory purposes” and “new for safety evaluation purposes.”
The distinctive properties of nanomaterials mean that some will pose novel safety questions
that are not adequately addressed by safety testing and evaluations performed on convention-
al versions of the same material. FDA thus should take some immediate steps to prepare itself
for regulating nanotechnology products and to deal with cosmetic, sunscreen and food-relat-
ed applications that are already entering the market.To accomplish this task and to prepare
more broadly for its oversight role, FDA needs better access to information about applications
of nanotechnology that are in the development pipeline; this report suggests some targeted
steps FDA could take to obtain such information.
Though I make a number of recommendations in this report, it will be obvious that I do
not have all the answers. I offer an evaluative framework and my own analysis in this report
as a starting point. I hope the report will stimulate discussion and debate among FDA offi-
cials and FDA’s many stakeholders who aspire to effective and efficient regulation of nan-
otechnology products. Further analysis and active dialogue will be required to get FDA reg-
ulation right in this new arena.
Finally, I would like to thank the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (“the
Project”)—a joint initiative of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and
The Pew Charitable Trusts. I am particularly grateful to its leaders, David Rejeski and Julia
Moore, for commissioning this study.They posed the question and turned me loose to begin
answering it, leaving responsibility for the content of the report solely in my hands. Likewise,
I thank FDA for providing me information on its programs, the people I interviewed for pro-
viding their perspectives, and the Project staff and two long-time colleagues of mine, Fred
Degnan and Terry Medley, for reviewing it. Finally, the Project’s Shilpa Deshpande and Evan
Michelson provided crucial research assistance, but they and all others I have mentioned bear
no responsibility for the result.
M.R.T.
5Nanotechnology and the Need for Oversight
The question addressed in this paper is whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
the tools it needs to regulate the products of nanotechnology.This question is important because
FDA will be charged with overseeing the safety of some of the earliest and most visible applica-
tions of nanotechnology – including cosmetics, sunscreens, food packaging, drugs and medical
devices – and will be expected to do so in a manner that protects public health, fosters benefi-
cial innovation and provides the basis for public confidence in nanotechnology products.
The extremely tiny, engineered particles of material made possible by nanotechnology
are not necessarily hazardous, but they have sufficiently different properties that their safe-
ty cannot be assumed based on what’s known about the safety of the conventional-size ver-
sions of the material.
It is thus reasonable to adopt the presumption that engineered nanomaterials are “new
for safety evaluation purposes,” which means that until evidence indicates otherwise, they
merit careful regulatory oversight by FDA, both before and after entering the marketplace.
Regulatory Principles from Current Law
FDA has a long history of regulating new technologies under the 1938 Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDC Act), which has been amended many times in response to new
technological and public health challenges. The FDC Act remains a resilient legal tool kit
for FDA and the source of regulatory principles that properly apply to oversight of nan-
otechnology products, including these:
• Protecting and promoting public health and the welfare of consumers are the proper driv-
ers of all FDA decision-making, with product safety being FDA’s first duty.
• Technological innovation is a valued means to the ends of both protecting and promoting
public health and, thus, FDA has a duty to manage its programs in ways that facilitate inno-
vation, consistent with its duty to ensure product safety.
• Public confidence in FDA and the safety and effectiveness of FDA-regulated products are
important goals of the regulatory process.
• The public health principle of prevention, implemented through FDA pre-market safety
review, properly governs when a product involves intended exposure to a substance that
has no prior history of exposure to human beings and no widely accepted and scientifi-
cally established demonstration of safety.
Executive Summary
6• Post-market oversight of FDA-regulated products is just as essential to protecting and pro-
moting public health as pre-market oversight.
Key Elements of FDA Oversight for Engineered Nanomaterials 
Based on the above principles drawn from current law, and considering what is known sci-
entifically about engineered nanomaterials, the FDA regulatory system for ensuring the safe-
ty of nanotechnology products should be capable of performing certain key functions, pre-
market and post-market, including the ability to:
Pre-market Oversight
• Obtain early and adequate information on nanotechnology products under development.
• Define and enforce safety standards for nanomaterials, including the nature and extent of the
testing required to satisfy them.
• Place the initial and continuing burden to demonstrate safety on the nanotechnology product’s
sponsor.
• Review the nanotechnology product’s safety prior to marketing and impose conditions as
needed to ensure safety.
Post-market Oversight
• Require post-market monitoring and testing as needed to ensure nanotechnology product safety.
• Require timely adverse event reporting.
• Inspect manufacturing establishments and examine records related to nanotechnology
product safety.
• Remove from the market nanotechnology products that appear to pose a significant safety
hazard or no longer meet the applicable safety standard.
There need not be a “one size fits all” approach to performing these functions; in fact, dif-
ferent approaches can be used for different product categories, as under the current FDC Act.
These desired functional elements comprise a useful framework, however, for analyzing the
adequacy of FDA’s legal tools for regulating nanotechnology products.
The Adequacy of Current Law for Performing Key Functions
Using this framework, the report analyzes the strength of current law as applied to nine cate-
gories of nanotechnology-based products that will come under the agency’s jurisdiction—
7cosmetic ingredients and products, whole foods, dietary supplements, generally recognized as
safe (GRAS) food ingredients, food additives, food packaging, medical devices, over-the-
counter (OTC) drugs and new drugs.
The results of this analysis, which are summarized in Tables 1 and 2, show that the legal
tools provided by the FDC Act vary widely from category to category, with cosmetics and
whole foods being subject to generally weaker statutory authorities and medical devices and
drugs being regulated under provisions that are stronger in terms of accomplishing the frame-
work’s pre-market and post-market functions. Many of these differences reflect implicit con-
gressional judgments about (1) the degree of potential risk posed by various categories – with
cosmetics deemed inherently less risky and new drugs inherently more risky – and (2) the
nature of the pre- and post-market oversight required to assure safety. Many of these judg-
ments and differences in regulatory approach continue to make sense, while others are chal-
lenged by new technologies, such as nanotechnology.
Based on the report’s analysis of current law, gaps in FDA’s legal authority with respect to
nanotechnology products include (1) the lack of pre-market oversight tools for cosmetics, (2)
FDA’s inability to acquire information about nanotechnology products early enough in their
development to prepare properly for their regulation and (3) inadequate authority for post-
market adverse event reporting.
The Adequacy of FDA’s Resources for Oversight of Nanotechnology
Even more so than legal authority, the issue affecting FDA’s readiness to regulate nanotechnolo-
gy products is resources. For the past decade and more, FDA’s resource base and overall capacity
have been eroded by the dual pressures of increasing demands and costs of doing business and the
failure of Congress and successive administrations to adequately fund even base operations.
Just to be able to do what it was doing in 1996 and continue the new activities mandated
for it since then, FDA’s 2006 budget would have to be 49% greater than it is. Under the
President’s proposed 2007 budget for FDA, however, the funding gap between responsibilities
and capacity will grow once more, to 56%.
This harsh budget reality threatens FDA’s ability to effectively oversee nanotechnology. It
means among other things that FDA lacks the resources it needs to build its own nanotech-
nology expertise, to develop the safety testing protocols and detection methods needed to
evaluate new nanotechnology products, to conduct its own risk research, to gather the nec-
essary pre-market data required to get ahead of commercialization and to oversee products
after they have entered the market.
The potential consequences of not adequately funding these FDA needs are at least
twofold: (1) in products areas where FDA lacks strong pre-market authority, such as cosmet-
ics and dietary supplements, FDA may miss potential safety problems or discover them too
late to prevent harm, thereby jeopardizing public health and public confidence in nanotech-
nology; and (2) for products going through FDA pre-market approval systems, FDA may lag
in providing regulatory guidance and prompt regulatory reviews to product developers, there-
by impeding innovation that benefits all.
8Recommendations
Over the long-term, Congress must address the gaps in FDA’s legal authority and resources.
In addition, however, there are steps FDA could take now under current law to address nan-
otechnology products that are already entering or appear close to entering the market.These
near-term actions are outlined first, followed by recommendations for longer-term legislative
and resource improvements.
Near-Term Actions
• Establish Criteria for “New for Legal and Regulatory Purposes” and “New for Safety Evaluation
Purposes.”The single most important step that FDA should take immediately is to establish cri-
teria and provide guidance to the industry for classifying some nanoscale materials as “new” for
legal, regulatory and safety purposes. For nanotechnology products that do not require individ-
ual product review and approval by FDA, manufacturers often have to make a threshold deter-
mination of whether the product poses a new safety question or otherwise should be consid-
ered a new or different material, compared with the conventional form.The conventional form
may, for example, have been listed in FDA regulations as a “generally recognized as safe”
(GRAS) food substance or as an approved food additive or food contact material. If the man-
ufacturer judges the nanotechnology version to be the same as the listed one, there is no legal
requirement to seek FDA pre-market review, and FDA may not become aware of the product
until after it enters the market.The burden would then rest on FDA to determine after the fact
whether there is a safety or regulatory concern warranting action.
To guide companies in making what amount to market-entry decisions for their partic-
ular products, FDA should promptly establish criteria for judging when a nanomaterial is
“new” for legal and regulatory purposes, i.e., for purposes of distinguishing it from versions
that are already listed in FDA’s GRAS, food additive and food packaging regulations or that
have been reviewed through the Cosmetic Ingredient Review (CIR).The criteria might be
based solely on material size, surface-volume ratios or other physical characteristics, or they
could include other properties that FDA might judge relevant.The point is to have a basis
for companies to know when they need to come to FDA prior to marketing, versus when
they can rely for legal and regulatory purposes on the existing approval, GRAS affirmation
or CIR review of the conventional form of the material.
A necessary extension of clarifying what is “new” for legal and regulatory purposes
would be to establish criteria for determining when a nanomaterial should be considered
“new for safety evaluation purposes.”These criteria presumably would include functional
properties that relate to the likelihood that the safety profile of the nanotechnology version
would be different from the conventional one. Such criteria would be helpful for all cate-
gories of FDA-regulated products as a guide to decisions about the need for toxicity testing
beyond what already exists on the conventional form. Another application of such criteria
might be to narrow the “new” category so that FDA review of nanotechnology versions of
already-approved conventional forms would be required when there is a scientific basis for
judging that such review is needed to ensure safety.
9• Resolve the Meaning of “Micronized” in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) Sunscreen Monograph.
FDA’s regulation authorizing the use of “micronized” titanium dioxide does not precisely
define the term, and some sunscreen product labels claim that nanomaterials are being used.
By defining the term “micronized” and clarifying the extent to which the monograph
embraces the full range of nanomaterials, FDA would help resolve the status of one of the
more visible early products of nanotechnology to enter the market and build confidence
that FDA is on top of its regulatory task.
• Request Cosmetic Companies to Submit Safety Substantiation Data. An FDA regulation requires
cosmetic companies to compile safety substantiation data on their ingredients, but it does
not give FDA access to review such data. In order to better inform FDA about the nan-
otechnology cosmetic products on the market today and the basis for their safety, FDA
should request the voluntary submission of substantiation data on all cosmetic products
making nanotechnology claims or containing nanomaterials.
• Provide the Cosmetic Industry Guidance on What Constitutes “Adequate” Substantiation. While
FDA does not currently have legal authority to access a company’s substantiation data, the
provision of guidance on what constitutes “adequate” substantiation for nanomaterials
would at least provide the industry with a common starting point and could contribute to
the establishment of a de facto standard of care for the industry.
• Provide Guidance on When the Use of Engineered Nanomaterials and Their Associated Claims Turn
Cosmetics into Drugs. The labels of some cosmetic products make explicit or implied claims
that the products contain nanomaterials that affect the structure or function of the body,
which is the legal basis for classifying a product as a “drug.” By providing guidance on when
the use of engineered nanomaterials and their associated claims in cosmetics make the prod-
uct a drug, FDA will be asserting its traditional regulatory authority and responsibility for
drugs and providing assurance that “cosmetic” ingredients having biological impact receive
appropriate review.
• Call for Data on Food Uses. In the absence of clear authority to access food industry data on
pipeline products, FDA should attempt to access at least some of the food industry’s safety-
related data by collaborating with industry, perhaps through a trade association, on a volun-
tary call for data on food uses of nanotechnology.
Legal Authority
• Call for Data Authority. To address its need to be informed, FDA should have administrative
authority to call for the submission of specified information on emerging technologies and
products under its jurisdiction, including products in the development pipeline.The legisla-
tion granting such authority should carefully define the purposes for which FDA may call
for data and establish criteria and a process so that the requests are focused and targeted.
10
• Discretionary Pre-Market Notification Authority. FDA should be provided rule-making author-
ity to establish interim pre-market notification mechanisms to address emerging and novel
technologies. FDA would have the discretion to identify product categories for which pre-
market notification would be required, the circumstances that trigger notification and the
data that would have to be submitted; a sunset provision should be included.
• Records Access. Records access could be achieved by expanding FDA’s general inspection
authority to include access to safety substantiation data and other safety information, and by
granting FDA the ability to request submission of such information in its new authority to
call for data.
• Post-Market Monitoring Authority. FDA should have authority to require post-market moni-
toring and surveillance, if needed, to assure the long-term safety of the product.
• Adverse Event Reporting. FDA should be given broad authority to devise mandatory adverse
event reporting systems that are appropriate for each product category and least burdensome
to achieve the legitimate oversight purpose.
Resource Needs
• Early Warning Information Collection. Congress should consider funding within the FDA
Office of the Commissioner, and in each of the operating centers, focal points for the gath-
ering of “scientific intelligence” to keep FDA abreast of technological developments and to
keep the agency involved in discussions occurring within the greater scientific community.
• FDA Regulatory Research. FDA’s research responsibility is to ensure that proper toxicity-test-
ing protocols are available and that the agency has the scientific knowledge and technical
tools, including analytical methodologies, to play its product review and post-market mon-
itoring roles.The $1 million FDA has invested in such research is noteworthy and admirable,
but it is not sufficient in light of the array of applications of nanotechnology the agency can
expect to confront in coming years.
• Building FDA’s Scientific and Regulatory Staff. Effective, science-based oversight of nanotechnol-
ogy products – oversight that understands the safety issues well enough to prevent problems
while not unduly slowing innovation – will require specialized scientific expertise and focused
effort by regulatory policy makers in all of FDA’s programs. Congress should provide FDA the
resources to acquire the needed scientific expertise and to bolster the agency’s regulatory
capacity across all of its programs, at both the policy-making and field oversight levels.
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Nanotechnology and FDA
The question I address in this paper is
whether the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has the tools it needs—legal, resource
and scientific—to regulate the products of
nanotechnology.This question is of increasing
importance and timeliness for the many ele-
ments of American industry that are investing
in this amazing new technology. It is also cru-
cial for the millions of consumers and patients
who stand to benefit from the innovative
products nanotechnology makes possible and
who will want to know that any potential
risks are well understood and addressed.
In simple terms, “nanotechnology” is the
ability to engineer matter in ways that take
advantage of their special properties at the
nanoscale.6 Nanotechnology has far-ranging
applications in cosmetics, foods and food
packaging, medical products and a host of
other areas of great importance to consumers,
public health, the economy and the environ-
ment. An inventory of manufacturer self-
identified consumer products, compiled by
the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies,
has identified over 300 such products already
available on the market worldwide.
Lux Research, Inc., a commercial
research organization, estimates that over
$32 billion in products incorporating nan-
otechnology were sold in 2005, with global
research and development spending reaching
$9.6 billion.7 In its 2006 Nanomedicine, Device
& Diagnostics Report, NanoBiotech News
estimates that there are currently 130 nano-
based drugs and delivery systems and 125
devices or diagnostic tests in preclinical, clin-
ical, or commercial development—an
increase of 68% since last year.8 Over the
longer term, Lux Research projects that $2.6
trillion in global manufactured goods will
incorporate nanotechnology,9 or about 15%
of total manufacturing output.
The very properties that make engi-
neered nanomaterials beneficial, however,
may present novel risks, or at least raise new
safety questions—questions that must be
understood and addressed if the benefits of
the technology are to be fully realized and
public health and the environment are to be
protected.
As the agency charged with regulating
the safety of some of the earliest and most
visible applications of nanotechnology—in
cosmetics, sunscreens, food packaging, drugs
13Regulating the Products of Nanotechnology
Introduction
6. FDA has not formally defined “nanotechnology” but it participates in the National Nanotechnology Initiative
(NNI), a White House-led program that coordinates federal agency efforts in nanoscale science, engineering, and
technology, and cites the NNI’s definition, which considers an activity to be “nanotechnology” if it involves all
of the following elements: (1) research and technology development at the atomic, molecular or macromolecular
levels, in the length scale of approximately 1-100 nanometers; (2) creating and using structures, devices and sys-
tems that have novel properties and functions because of their small and/or intermediate size; and (3) ability to
control or manipulate on the atomic scale. Lux Research, Inc. offers this succinct definition of nanotechnology:
“The purposeful engineering of matter at scales of less than 100 nanometers (nm) to achieve size-dependent
properties and functions.” The Nanotech Report 4th Edition. New York, NY: Lux Research, Inc., 2006, p. 1.
7.“Nanotechnology in $32 Billion Worth of Products: Global Funding for Nanotech R&D Reaches $9.6 Billion.”
New York, NY: Lux Research, Inc., May 8, 2006.Available at
www.luxresearchinc.com/press/RELEASE_TNR4.pdf, accessed September 27, 2006.
8. 2006 Nanomedicine, Device & Diagnostics Report.Atlanta, GA: NanoBiotech News, 2006.
9. The Nanotech Report 4th Edition. New York, NY: Lux Research, Inc., 2006, p. iii.
and medical devices, all of which will direct-
ly affect consumers—FDA will be at the
“heart of the action,” as it will bear consid-
erable responsibility for answering questions
about product safety and potential risks. As
with past revolutions in genomics and other
technological fields, FDA will be expected
by society to ensure the safety of nanotech-
nology products without impeding innova-
tion or blocking the public’s access to the
promised benefits. Clearly, the stakes are
high: the products FDA regulates account for
about 25 cents of every dollar consumers
spend.10 If FDA is successful, we all win. If
FDA fails, we all lose.
The extraordinary pace of innovation in
nanotechnology makes it timely, if not
urgent, to examine FDA’s preparedness to
play this vital oversight role. Research and
product development are proceeding with
great speed, and neither science nor the
marketplace will wait for years of delibera-
tion over how nanotechnology products
should be regulated. Rather, at an accelerat-
ing pace, new products will be challenging
FDA to set policies and make product-spe-
cific decisions that will have a lasting impact
on how the safety of nanotechnology is reg-
ulated and on how the products of nan-
otechnology are seen and accepted by the
public. This is not an easy challenge, espe-
cially since current knowledge about the
potential risks of new engineered nanoma-
terials is limited.11 FDA will, nevertheless, be
expected to acquire knowledge and deploy
its regulatory tools in ways that detect and
prevent risks while not impeding beneficial
innovation.
The timeliness of this report’s topic—in
FDA’s centennial year as a public health
regulatory agency—is heightened by
broader questions about whether FDA is
equipped today to meet the public’s high
expectations. FDA has a long record and
traditionally strong reputation as a science-
based public health regulatory agency, with
extensive experience overseeing the intro-
duction of new technology. In some ways,
nanotechnology is just another in a long
line of new technological challenges FDA
has faced using the legal tools and resources
at its disposal.
But today, FDA is an agency under enor-
mous stress. Its job is being made more diffi-
cult every year, not only by promising new
technologies in biomedicine and many other
fields but also by new public health chal-
lenges, from bird flu to bioterrorism, and by
the growing and globalizing marketplace for
the products FDA regulates.As the job grows
larger and more difficult every year, howev-
er, the agency’s resources are shrinking and
its public credibility is eroding.
In relation to the job it is expected to do,
FDA has been under-funded for many years.
FDA’s 2006 budget would have to be 49%
greater than it is just to maintain its 1996
base level of activity and continue the initia-
tives Congress has directed it to undertake.
This funding shortfall would continue
growing, to 56%, under FDA’s proposed
budget for 2007.
Public confidence in FDA is also on the
decline. A recent Harris poll showed that
between 2004 and 2006, the share of the
American population holding a positive
10.“An FDA Overview: Protecting Consumers, Protecting Public Health.” Rockville, MD: United States Food and
Drug Administration,August 2004.Available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/fda101/fda101text.html,
accessed September 27, 2006.
11.Andrew Maynard. Nanotechnology:A Research Strategy for Addressing Risk. Washington, DC: Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies,Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2006.
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view of FDA’s efforts to ensure the safety, as
well as the effectiveness, of new prescription
drugs dropped from 56% to 37%.12 This
question of public trust in FDA is not a small
matter for nanotechnology companies. In
recent congressional testimony, a leading
nanotechnology industry analyst from Lux
Research noted that firms developing prod-
ucts using engineered nanomaterials could
find commercial feasibility blocked by the
public perception that these materials are
dangerous—even if they are proved safe.13
Against this backdrop, nanotechnology
provides a revealing and very timely lens
through which to examine the bigger pic-
ture of FDA’s ability to do the job society
expects it to do, as affected by the interac-
tion of the agency’s legal authority, resources
and scientific tools. And this bigger picture
is directly relevant to nanotechnology. FDA’s
legal tools, virtually all of which pre-date
nanotechnology by decades, are the essential
starting point, but legal authorities are of lit-
tle value without adequate resources to
apply them. Scarce resources also impede
FDA’s ability to assemble the new scientific
knowledge and tools that will be needed to
effectively regulate the products of nan-
otechnology. To really understand and
improve FDA’s preparedness to regulate in
this new arena, it is necessary to look at
FDA’s legal, resource and scientific tools as
an integrated whole.
A truly complete analysis of FDA’s tools
for regulating the products of nanotechnol-
ogy is, to put it mildly, a daunting task. FDA
implements a voluminous compilation of
laws that regulate widely diverse products:
lipstick and sunscreens, artificial sweeteners
and food packaging, artificial hips and heart
valves, cancer drugs and AIDS vaccines, to
name a few. FDA regulates the safety and
proper labeling of all products within its
jurisdiction in widely diverse ways, as well
as the therapeutic effectiveness of medical
devices, drugs and vaccines. Complicating
matters further, judgments about the ade-
quacy of FDA’s tools necessarily hinge on
the particular product category and appli-
cation of nanotechnology under considera-
tion and a complex mix of legal, policy, sci-
entific, agency resource and social-value
considerations.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to
tackle all of these issues. As a first step into
the thicket, however, I examine in this paper
FDA’s legal tools and resources for regulating
the safety of nanotechnology products. I will
analyze the legal tools based on principles
that are embedded in the law FDA current-
ly administers—as it has evolved over the
past 70 years—as well as my perspective on
what the public expects from FDA and what
I think is needed to achieve three goals crit-
ical to the success of nanotechnology:
• protecting public health;
• fostering innovation; and 
• providing the basis for public confidence in
the products of nanotechnology.
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12. Beckey Bright.“Americans Growing Less Confident in FDA’s Job on Safety, Poll Shows” The Wall Street Journal
Online, May 24, 2006.Available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB114831296787359612-
uW9Ve_ZtSkQ20zMT5k2fNvR14Uw_20060622.html, accessed September 27, 2006.
13. Matthew M. Nordan.“Nanotech Commercialization Has Advanced, but Government Action to Address Risk
Has Not.”Testimony before the United States House of Representatives Committee on Science,“Research on
Environmental and Safety Impacts of Nanotechnology:What are the Federal Agencies Doing?” September 21,
2006.Available at http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full06/Sept%2021/nordan.pdf, accessed September
27, 2006.
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I will also review the status of FDA’s
resources and how that affects the agency’s
ability to achieve these central goals of regula-
tion in the area of nanotechnology. On the
basis of this analysis, I will identify gaps in
FDA’s legal and resource tool kit and make
recommendations for filling them.
Some of my recommendations are directed
at FDA, which certainly has a leadership role
to play in preparing to regulate in this new
technological arena.The primary audience for
the analysis and recommendations in this
paper lies, however, outside FDA, in the polit-
ical, business, public health and consumer
communities that share an interest in seeing
that FDA can effectively regulate the products
of nanotechnology. After all, the people who
work at FDA are keenly aware of what their
statutes and resources permit them to do and,
from my experience,FDA staff throughout the
many centers and offices involved in nan-
otechnology will work hard to make the best
use of the tools they have to carry out their
assigned mission.
The question is whether society, acting
through Congress and politically accountable
officials of the executive branch, has given
FDA the tools it needs. I conclude that FDA
has many of the legal tools it needs but lacks
others, and that it is severely lacking in the
resources required to prepare scientifically and
otherwise for effective regulation of nan-
otechnology products and to mount a pro-
gram in which the public will have confi-
dence. FDA can and should participate in
identifying these gaps, but it is for others in
society to address them.
Potential Risks: What is New
about Nanotechnology? 
The starting point for thinking about FDA’s
tools for regulating the safety of nanotechnol-
ogy products is an understanding of (and
some assumptions about) their potential risks.
Much has been written about the special
properties of nanomaterials and the state of
our knowledge and uncertainty about their
potential adverse health effects. The Royal
Society & The Royal Academy of
Engineering in the United Kingdom, the
European Commission’s Scientific Com-
mittee on Emerging and Newly Identified
Health Risks and the International Life
Sciences Institute in the United States have
addressed the issue, as have many others.14
I will not recap that growing literature
here. As a lay policy analyst, I take this liter-
ature at face value and draw the following
understandings and assumptions from it:
• Manufactured nanomaterials have physical,
chemical and other properties that typical-
ly differ from larger-scale materials of the
same substance in ways that may affect the
way nanomaterials interact with the
human body, such as differing absorption
patterns and differing abilities to reach cer-
tain organs and penetrate cell walls.
• The different properties and behaviors of
engineered nanomaterials do not mean
they are necessarily hazardous, but they do
mean that the body of evidence used to
assess the safety of larger materials cannot
14. See: Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties. London, UK:The Royal Society & The
Royal Academy of Engineering, July 2004; The Appropriateness of Existing Methodologies to Assess the Potential
Risks Associated with Engineered and Adventitious Products of Nanotechnologies. Brussels, Belgium: European
Commission/SCHENIHR, March 10, 2006; Gunter Oberdorster, et al,“Principles for Characterizing the
Potential Human Health Effects From Exposure to Nanomaterials: Elements of a Screening Strategy,” Particle
and Fibre Toxicology 2005, 2:8.
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be assumed to demonstrate the safety of
the corresponding nanomaterials.
• Materials produced at the nanoscale vary
widely in their properties and in their
applications, with the likelihood that, as
used, some engineered nanomaterials will
pose hazards while others will not. The
ability to engineer these materials with
precise nanoscale structures—including
surface layers and diverse morpholo-
gies—adds another layer of complexity to
determining which materials will be haz-
ardous and which will be benign.
• For these reasons, judgments about the
safety of any particular engineered nano-
material cannot be based either on the
safety of larger-scale versions of the same
material or on easy generalizations about
nanomaterials as a class; case-by-case safe-
ty assessment is required.
• The one generalization that may be
appropriate is that nanometer-diameter
particles (nanoparticles) bound in a
matrix of other material are less likely
than unbound or free nanoparticles to be
systemically absorbed and distributed and
thus are less likely to pose a safety con-
cern, though end-of-life disposal of such
bound nanoparticles could present
potential risks.
• Finally, it is not clear that existing animal
toxicity-testing protocols, on which we
rely to assess the safety of most chemicals,
can be used in their present form to assess
engineered nanomaterials; for example,
the traditional measure of dose in terms of
the test substance’s mass may have to give
way to ratios between the surface area of
a nanomaterial and its volume or mass.
One way to distill and apply this state of
knowledge on the safety of engineered
nanomaterials is to adopt the presumption
that they are “new for safety evaluation pur-
poses.”This is not meant to say that any par-
ticular nanomaterial is unsafe. It does mean,
however, that, a priori, we just do not know.
This presumption is central to the discus-
sion that follows, but it also raises an impor-
tant definitional issue that FDA and others
must address in considering how best to
apply FDA’s current regulatory tools and to
determine whether there are gaps in those
tools that need to be filled.
I am using the terms “nanotechnology”
and terms such as “nanomaterial” and “nan-
otechnology product” to refer to tech-
niques and applications that are encom-
passed within the NNI’s definition of “nan-
otechnology,” which includes manipulation
and use of matter at the scale of 1–100
nanometers to take advantage of novel
properties and functions that occur at that
scale. It is under these circumstances that it
seems fair and necessary to establish the
presumption that an engineered nanomate-
rial is “new for safety evaluation purposes.”
Terms such as “nanotechnology” and
“nanomaterial” are often used loosely, how-
ever, to apply to a broad range of techniques
and resulting materials, many of which are
properly presumed new for safety evalua-
tion purposes while others may not be.
Making clear this distinction, including the
criteria for drawing it, should be one of
FDA’s high-priority tasks, because it is a
distinction that does and should play a crit-
ical role in FDA’s regulatory program.
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Evolution of the FDC Act
In analyzing the adequacy of FDA’s legal tools
for regulating nanotechnology products, it is
neither necessary nor wise to start from
scratch. FDA has been regulating the applica-
tion of new and advancing technologies for
decades, under a series of congressional enact-
ments going back to 1938, and as FDA’s role
has evolved over the years, some key principles
have emerged concerning FDA’s regulatory
role and approach.Certainly, each new wave of
technology challenges existing principles and
approaches and may warrant revising them, as
has happened many times over the years, but
the proper starting point for this paper’s analy-
sis is the role FDA plays under current law.
Constitutionally and functionally, FDA and
its mission are creatures of Congress.
Established in 1906, FDA is an expert, science-
based, regulatory agency whose job is to carry
out the public health mission assigned to it by
Congress, using the legal tools and resources
Congress provides. As an executive branch
agency, FDA properly operates within a recog-
nized range of discretion and autonomy, but its
job is to implement laws passed by Congress.
The principal law under which FDA operates
is the Federal Food,Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
1938 (FDC Act), as amended dozens of times
in the nearly 70 years since its enactment.
The history of the FDC Act and its many
amendments is germane to nanotechnology
because it is largely a history of Congress
responding to evolving food and medical tech-
nologies, to demands from consumers and
industry for FDA to oversee the introduction
of these technologies and to occasional “crises”
that catalyze the politics of legislative reform.
As a result, the current FDC Act reveals as well
as, or better than, any other source the accu-
mulated and evolving expectations of the
American public concerning FDA’s role in
dealing with the public health consequences of
new technology.
The original 1938 law, for example, estab-
lished the first federal requirements for pre-
market safety testing and FDA approval of
new drugs in response to the famous Elixir
Sulfanilamide disaster, in which the poisonous
solvent glycol was used in a cough medicine
and killed 107 people, including many chil-
dren. The 1938 act also gave FDA new
authority to establish legal limits on pesticide
residues in food in response to public health
concerns raised by the wider use of chemical
pesticides in agriculture. It also established
FDA’s first regulatory authority over cosmet-
ics, authorizing FDA to remove a cosmetic
product from the market if the agency could
prove it was hazardous.
Other instructive examples of society,
through Congress, responding to new technol-
ogy and to evolving public expectations
include:
•The Food Additive Amendment of 1958. This
amendment was enacted in response to the
urging of the food industry, which was con-
cerned about public acceptance of the
expanding use of chemicals in food process-
ing.Congress required pre-market safety test-
ing and approval of food additives unless they
were already “generally recognized as safe”
(GRAS) by scientists.
•The Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of
1962. These amendments were enacted in
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response to the growing sophistication of
drug development and marketing and
sparked by the discovery that the new sleep-
ing pill thalidomide could cause severe birth
defects. Congress strengthened the pre-mar-
ket testing and evaluation of new drugs by
requiring that they be tested for effective-
ness as well as safety.
•The Medical Device Amendments of 1976.
These amendments were enacted as medical
technology was advancing rapidly to pro-
duce sophisticated and life-saving devices
and in response to the Dalkon Shield
episode, in which many women were
injured from use of an intrauterine contra-
ceptive device that had not been adequate-
ly tested and was lawfully marketed without
FDA approval. Congress required that med-
ical device manufacturers and products be
registered with FDA, that FDA be notified
prior to any new product entering the mar-
ket and that new products go through a
complete pre-market testing and approval
process for safety and effectiveness, unless
the sponsor could demonstrate that the
product is substantially equivalent to a prod-
uct marketed prior to 1976.
•The Dietary Supplement Health and Education
Act of 1994. This act was passed in response
to concerns of the dietary supplement indus-
try and its customers that FDA intended to
require supplement companies to prove the
safety of supplements that already had a his-
tory of marketing. Congress classified a wide
array of supplements as foods and precluded
shifting to the supplement manufacturer the
burden of proof on safety with respect to
products marketed prior to enactment of the
1994 law. But, Congress also required that
ingredients used in a supplement product for
the first time after 1994 either have a history
of use in food in the same chemical form as
those being used in the supplement product
or be submitted to FDA prior to marketing
along with information substantiating the
safety of those ingredients.
•The Food and Drug Administration Modern-
ization Act of 1997. This act was passed, in
part, in response to concerns that FDA’s
approval processes for drugs and devices were
unduly slowing innovation and market entry
of beneficial new products. Congress stream-
lined the process in various ways while
retaining established standards for product
testing and FDA’s pre-market evaluation of
safety and effectiveness.
The foregoing components of the FDC Act
deal primarily with FDA’s pre-market over-
sight of the products it regulates. Equally
important to FDA’s public health role are the
inspection, adverse event reporting and
enforcement provisions of the law, which
empower FDA to discover safety problems
with marketed products, to take action to
remove specific versions of a product from the
market or to ban the product entirely as
required to protect consumers and patients.
The inherent inability of pre-market testing to
reveal all there is to know about the safety and
effectiveness of innovative new technologies
and applications means that FDA’s regulation
and oversight is best understood as a continu-
um, which includes pre-market review and
approval but also encompasses FDA’s response
to problems identified and experience gained
throughout the product’s lifetime of use.
As with its pre-market authorities, FDA’s
post-market authorities vary across product
categories. For example, during inspections of
drug and many medical device manufacturing
facilities, FDA has broad access to records relat-
ing to the safety and proper manufacturing of
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products, while FDA’s access to similar records
regarding foods is generally conditioned on
FDA having a reason to believe that a product
poses a serious health hazard. In contrast, FDA
has no authority to inspect records related to
the safety of a cosmetic product.Similarly,FDA
can require drug and medical device manufac-
turers to report side effects, malfunctions or
other adverse events associated with their
products, but it has no such authority for foods
and cosmetics.
Key Features of the Current Law
What does the history of the FDC Act teach
us about its key features? The first, overarching
observation suggested by the evolution of the
FDC Act is that Congress has built a frame-
work that tailors regulatory standards and
processes for new technologies in accordance
with broad assumptions about the risks posed
by particular product categories and the per-
ceived need for pre-market review and
approval of products by government.
Importantly, this framework is not built
around the underlying technologies them-
selves. FDA does not regulate polymer chem-
istry, bioengineering or genomics per se. It
regulates the products produced through the
application of these technologies.And this is a
wise approach, because the safety of products
for consumers rests on how the technology is
applied to produce particular products and the
resulting properties of those products.
While this approach and the current struc-
ture of the law have clear strengths, they also
have limitations that become most evident
when dramatically new technologies come
along. For example, most cosmetic ingredi-
ents are not subject to any FDA pre-market
review for safety based on the assumption, in
1938, that lotions, creams and other materials
applied externally to improve appearance
pose little safety concern. In 1960, in response
to concerns about the safety of coal tar hair
dyes, Congress required that color additives
used in cosmetics and all other FDA-regulat-
ed products be tested for safety and approved
by FDA prior to marketing.These broad cat-
egorical assumptions about potential risk—
pre-market review for colors but none for
other cosmetic ingredients—may be sound as
a general matter, but do they hold true when
engineered nanomaterials are used to
enhance the functional properties of non-
color cosmetic ingredients? 
Similarly, the regulatory structure for food
ingredients and food packaging materials
established in 1958 is built around the recogni-
tion that many natural and manmade materials
have a long history of safe use in food or oth-
erwise are generally recognized to be safe.The
policy idea is that subjecting every new use of
these materials to an FDA pre-market safety
review is not necessary to assure safety and not
a good use of resources. Does this assumption
hold when such materials are manufactured
and used at the nanoscale? 
Therapeutic drugs and medical devices
are generally subject to more comprehensive
pre-market safety regulation than cosmetics
and foods, but they, too, are regulated in ways
that reflect categorical assumptions about risk
and the extent of pre-market oversight
required to ensure safety. Most over-the-
counter (OTC) drugs are regulated under an
FDA monograph system that lists drug ingre-
dients that are “generally recognized” by
experts to be safe and effective for specific
uses, based on a history of safe use or scien-
tific evidence. Products comprised of these
ingredients are exempt from the definition of
“new drug” and from the individual product
licensing requirement that applies to new
drugs. For medical devices, the pre-market
notification option for “substantially equiva-
lent devices” provides a means to avoid a full-
blown pre-market review of a device’s safety
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and effectiveness based on the assumption
that, for these devices, such a review is
unnecessary. Does nanotechnology challenge
these approaches?
These features of the FDC Act and the law’s
history give rise to a second broad observation:
there is an inherent tension between the
imperative to protect the public’s health from
harm and the goal of promoting public health
and consumer welfare in general, by fostering
access to innovative new products.This tension
is manifest in the complex, highly varied legal
framework Congress has created for the wide
array of products FDA regulates. It is anything
but a “one size fits all” regulatory system.And,
in general, this approach makes sense. It reflects
the scientific and public health reality that
products differ widely in the degree of risk
they pose, as well as the political reality that
Congress will always seek to balance the need
to protect public health and the need to avoid
undue restraints on innovation, business activi-
ty and consumer choice. Consumers benefit
from both careful regulation to ensure product
safety and ready access to innovative and ben-
eficial new products.
Regulatory Principles 
from Current Law
With this background in mind, several regula-
tory principles emerge from the current FDC
Act that I believe should inform FDA’s regula-
tion of the products of nanotechnology.
• First, protecting and promoting public health
and the welfare of consumers are the proper
drivers of all FDA decision-making, with
product safety being FDA’s first duty.15
• Second, technological innovation is a valued
means to the ends of both protecting and
promoting public health and, thus, FDA has a
duty to manage its programs in ways that
facilitate innovation, consistent with its duty
to ensure product safety.
• Third, public confidence in FDA and the
safety and effectiveness of FDA-regulated
products are important goals of the regulato-
ry process because they help ensure that the
benefits of innovation will be available and
accepted in the marketplace without
unfounded concerns about product safety
and effectiveness.
• Fourth, the public health principle of preven-
tion, implemented through FDA pre-market
safety review,properly governs in cases where
a product involves intended exposure to a
substance that has no prior history of expo-
sure to human beings and no widely accept-
ed and scientifically established demonstra-
tion of safety.
• Fifth, and finally, post-market oversight of
FDA-regulated products is just as essential to
protecting and promoting public health as
pre-market oversight.
Now let’s consider how these principles
apply to nanotechnology.
15. It is important to note that, in the FDC Act and in good public health policy,“safety” is not an absolute. Congress
has established a range of safety standards that vary by product category. For food additives, the standard is “reason-
able certainty of no harm,” with the burden on the sponsor to prove the additive meets this standard. For drugs
and medical devices, all of which pose some degree of risk, judgments about safety balance risks and therapeutic
benefits. For cosmetics, whole foods, and food contaminants (as opposed to intentional additives)—articles that are
not subject to FDA pre-market review—the “safety” standard is in fact a risk standard (e.g.,“reasonable possibility
of harm”) that FDA must prove has been violated in order to remove a product form the market. In all these cases,
FDA’s job is to implement and enforce the safety standards established by Congress.
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The final preliminary step before analyzing
the adequacy of FDA’s legal tools for regu-
lating nanotechnology products is to estab-
lish a normative framework for the analy-
sis—to explain what I mean by “adequate.”
I will do this by laying out the key func-
tional elements of an effective FDA regula-
tory framework for nanotechnology-
derived products, drawing on current law
and the principles embedded in it.The ele-
ments of the framework are the things I
think FDA should be able to do to achieve
the three primary goals of ensuring product
safety, fostering innovation and maintaining
public confidence in the products of nan-
otechnology.
The importance of spelling out such a
normative framework cannot be overstated.
A clear understanding of FDA’s goals and of
what FDA should be able to do to achieve
them is essential to analyzing the adequacy
of FDA’s legal tools, and it should drive any
public policy debate about whether to
expand or contract FDA’s tool kit.
Describing this framework is also a way of
expressing my judgment about what FDA
needs to be able to do to meet the public’s
expectations concerning government over-
sight of nanotechnology products. This is
ultimately a subjective and political ques-
tion, of course, to be resolved by Congress,
and, like most such questions, it is prone to
controversy. By being explicit about my
perspective, I hope to stimulate thought
and debate, as well as to frame the analysis
to follow.
The framework I propose includes pre-
market and post-market elements.
Pre-Market Oversight 
The common justification for any govern-
ment pre-market oversight of a new technol-
ogy is that it is needed to (1) ensure product
safety (and possibly effectiveness) in fact, and
(2) maintain public confidence in the prod-
uct’s safety based on the assumed objectivity
of the government safety review. These two
justifications are closely linked.
Without a pre-market review by govern-
ment or some other objective body, the
determination of product safety is left, in the
first instance, to the judgment of the compa-
ny that developed the product and has a
commercial interest in marketing it. Most
companies take their safety responsibilities
very seriously. However, because the inter-
pretation of safety data and the application of
safety standards are inherently judgmental
affairs, the public has long insisted on pre-
market review of health-sensitive products,
such as food ingredients, drugs and medical
devices, that involve substances having no
prior history of exposure to human beings
and no widely accepted and scientifically
established demonstration of safety. Such a
review both increases the likelihood that
safety issues will be identified and addressed
prior to marketing, and it helps maintain
public confidence in the product’s safety.
I think this justification for pre-market
review applies, in general, to the FDA-regu-
lated products of nanotechnology that are
fairly considered “new for safety evaluation
purposes.”This does not mean that there is a
“one size fits all” solution for pre-market
oversight and review of nanotechnology
Key Elements of a Regulatory Framework
for Nanotechnology Products
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products, as I will discuss later in this paper.
It does suggest, however, that FDA should
have sufficient pre-market authority to carry
out the following activities for nanotechnol-
ogy products:
1. Obtain early and adequate information on
nanotechnology products in the development
pipeline. Companies that are developing
new technologies and product applica-
tions always know more about them 
earlier in the process than FDA does. To
prepare for effective and efficient over-
sight—including making informed deter-
minations on such matters as whether an
application is “new for safety evaluation
purposes”—FDA needs access to infor-
mation on products in the development
pipeline under conditions that inform
FDA while protecting the company’s
legitimate proprietary interests.
2. Define and enforce safety standards for nano-
materials, including the nature and extent of
the testing required to satisfy them. One pur-
pose and value of pre-market oversight is
that it establishes a level and clearly
drawn playing field with respect to safety
and a basis for judging that all marketed
products satisfy a safety standard that is
known to and accepted by society.
Typically, Congress expresses safety stan-
dards for FDA-regulated products in
broad terms, leaving it to FDA to flesh
out their operational meaning, including
testing requirements.
3. Place the initial and continuing burden to
demonstrate safety on the nanotechnology prod-
uct’s sponsor. This means the product spon-
sor must marshal evidence sufficient to
demonstrate that its product is safe, in
accordance with the applicable safety stan-
dard, and respond with data to any signifi-
cant new safety questions.This is in lieu of
the government having to prove that the
product falls short of the standard or is haz-
ardous.This element is essential if the goal
is to prevent harm rather than react to and
correct safety problems after they occur.
4. Review the nanotechnology product’s safety
prior to marketing and impose conditions as
needed to ensure safety. A pre-market safety
review by FDA provides an objective
assessment of whether the product meets
the applicable safety standard, thereby
increasing the likelihood that the product
will, in fact, be safe, and provides a strong
basis for public confidence in the product’s
safety.The procedural nature of the review
could range from pre-market notification
to a full-blown approval and product
licensing regime, but inherent in any cred-
ible pre-market review is FDA’s ability to
impose conditions on the marketing and
use of the product, such as compliance
with good manufacturing practices
(GMPs), as needed to ensure safety.
Post-Market Oversight
As noted earlier, one of the key principles
drawn from current law is that post-market
oversight of FDA-regulated products is just
as essential to protecting and promoting
public health as pre-market oversight. No
amount of pre-market testing can rule out
the possibility of unanticipated safety prob-
lems occurring from the actual use of the
product. Even the large-scale clinical trials
used to assess drug safety and efficacy, which
may involve hundreds or even thousands of
subjects, are not capable of detecting every
low- incidence adverse effect that could
occur and be of great public health signifi-
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cance when the drug is administered over
long periods to millions of people. For
health-protection reasons alone, FDA must
have the tools to detect and promptly cor-
rect such problems.
The ability to deal effectively with safety
concerns that might arise post-market is also
important to achieving the public health ben-
efits of innovation. Absent that ability, FDA
would, in prudence, likely impose more strin-
gent pre-market testing requirements and
take an even more cautious approach to its
pre-market evaluation, which could substan-
tially delay access to beneficial new products.
With these concerns in mind, FDA should
have authority to carry out the following
post-market oversight for products of nan-
otechnology:
1. Require post-market monitoring and testing
of nanotechnology products as needed to
ensure safety. In light of the limitations of
pre-market testing and the novelty of the
issues that may be posed by certain appli-
cations of nanotechnology, FDA should
have the authority to require sponsors to
actively monitor post-market experience
with the product or to undertake formal
data collection when needed to provide
an adequate assurance of safety.This is in
keeping with the on-going responsibility
of the sponsor to demonstrate the prod-
uct’s safety.
2. Require timely adverse event reporting. Even
when special post-market monitoring or
testing is not justified, adverse events may
well occur after a product enters the mar-
ket. FDA will never have the resources to
detect all such safety-related problems,
but, in the normal course of their busi-
ness, product sponsors are typically the
first to learn about them. Significant
adverse events should be reported
promptly to FDA.
3. Inspect manufacturing establishments and
examine records related to nanotechnology
product safety. The safety of a nano-
enabled product may hinge on its quality,
purity or other attributes that are affected
by how it is manufactured, which is why
marketing of most FDA-regulated prod-
ucts is conditioned on compliance with
GMPs.To prevent, detect and investigate
manufacturing-related safety problems,
FDA needs full access to facilities and
safety-related records.
4. Remove from the market nanotechnology prod-
ucts that appear to pose a significant safety haz-
ard or no longer meet the applicable safety stan-
dard. When FDA has reason to believe that
a safety problem poses a significant hazard
to health, the agency should be able to
recall the product through an expeditious
administrative process pending final reso-
lution of the safety issue. If FDA concludes
upon further analysis that the product no
longer meets the applicable safety standard,
the sponsor’s authorization to market the
product would be revoked.
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This section provides a brief overview and
summary analysis of FDA’s legal tools for 
regulating nanotechnology products. The
analysis is organized around the functional
elements of pre-market and post-market
oversight described in the preceding section,
which I believe are the key elements of a sys-
tem needed to achieve the goals of protect-
ing public health, fostering innovation and
providing the basis for public confidence in
nanotechnology products.
A couple of methodological points are in
order. First, in this section, the focus of the
analysis is on the legal tools themselves and
how they contribute to performing each
function. I provide my perspective, drawn
from experience, concerning the practical
effectiveness of FDA’s program in each area,
but I have not formally evaluated the per-
formance of any program. I also do not con-
sider the impact of scarce resources on the
effectiveness of FDA’s regulatory programs. I
will do that in the next section.
Second, I have used a simplified, four-level
rating system—none, weak, moderate, strong
—to describe FDA’s legal capacity to per-
form key regulatory functions for nanotech-
nology products.This will, as intended, pro-
voke debate, and, no doubt, disagreement.
My purpose is to provide a succinct basis for
comparison of the relative strength of FDA’s
legal tools across the range of product cate-
gories and a starting point for discussion.
As a reference point for the analysis to fol-
low, Table 1 provides an overview of FDA’s
safety-related legal authorities (pre-market
and post-market) for nine categories of prod-
ucts: cosmetic ingredients, whole foods,
dietary supplements, GRAS food ingredi-
ents, food additives, food packaging, medical
devices, OTC drugs and “new” (generally
prescription) drugs. This is by no means a
complete catalog of product categories regu-
lated by FDA—color additives, animal drugs
and biologics, to name a few, are not includ-
ed—but it includes products that seem most
likely to be affected early on by nanotechnol-
ogy. Table 1 illustrates the diversity of
approaches adopted by Congress for regulat-
ing these categories of products, ranging
from the largely post-market approach for
Overview and Analysis of FDA’s 
Legal Tools for Regulating
Nanotechnology Products
“Nano-Labels: The Tower of Babel“
“Ingredient or packaging labels found on a selection
of cosmetic, personal care and dietary supplement
products:
“On a skin cream:
“optimizes cellular energetic balance using a
nanocomplex of multiple intra-cellular transmitters”
“On a dietary supplement:
“Nano Calcium Gluconate, Nano Calcium
Carbonate, Nano Magnesium Carbonate”
“On a sunscreen: 
“Our anti-aging ingredients are nano-zinc oxide…”
“On a face cream:
“…the first to harness the power of Fullerene C60 in
the field of cosmetics”
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TABLE 1. FDA’S SAFETY-RELATED LEGAL AUTHORITIES
Cosmetic
Ingredienti
Whole
Food
Dietary
Supplement 
GRAS
Food
Ingredient
Food
Additive
Food
Packaging
Medical
Device
OTC
Drug
New
Drugii
FDA Judicial Remedies to
Remove Risky Productsxv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continuing Sponsor 
Burden to Demonstrate
Safety
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Market
Monitoring and Testing No No No No Limited
xvi Limitedxvii Yesxviii No Limitedxix
Mandatory Adverse 
Event Reporting No No No No No No Yes No Yes
xx
Establishment
Inspection Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Access to 
Safety Records No Limited
xxi Limitedxxii Limitedxxiii Limitedxxiv Limitedxxv Yesxxvi Yes Yes
Voluntary Recall Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mandatory Recall No No No No No No Yesxxvii No No
Pre-Market Tools
Establishment Registration Voluntary Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Product Registration Voluntary No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Safety Substantiation
without Pre-Market
Notificationiii 
Optionaliv No No Nov No No No No No
Pre-Market Notification No Novi Limitedvii No No Yesviii Yesix No No
Pre-Market Safety 
Reviewand Approval
By Regulation
No No No No Yes Yesx No Yesxi No
Pre-Market Safety Review
and Approval
By Product License
No No No No No No Yesxii No Yes
Mandatory Good
Manufacturing
Practices (GMPs)
No Noxiii Yesxiv No No No Yes Yes Yes
Post-Market Tools
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TABLE 2. CAPACITY OF FDA’S LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ACHIEVE THE PRIMARY GOALS 
OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS
cosmetics and whole foods to the more
intensive combination of pre-market and
post-market approaches for medical devices
and drugs.
The following analysis briefly describes
FDA’s approach for each category and the
basis for my judgment about the relative
strength of FDA’s legal capacity to perform
the key oversight functions.These judgments
are summarized in Table 2.
Cosmetic Ingredients and Products
Overview
Cosmetics are of particular interest for this
analysis. As reported in the Project on
Emerging Nanotechnologies nanotechnolo-
gy consumer products inventory,16 cosmetic
products claiming use of nanomaterials are
among the most prominent early entries into
the U.S. consumer marketplace.Additionally,
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Cosmetic
Ingredient
Whole
Food
Dietary
Supplement 
GRAS
Food
Ingredient
Food
Additive
Food
Packaging
Medical
Device
OTC
Drug
New
Drug 
Pre-Market 
Obtain Early
Information on Pipeline None None None Weak Weak Weak
Mod-
erate Weak
Mod-
erate
Enforce Safety and 
Testing Requirements Weak None Weak Moderate Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong
Place Burden To Prove
Safety on Sponsor Weak None Weak Moderate Strong Strong Strong Strong Strong
Review Safety
Prior to Marketing None None Weak Weak Strong Strong Strong
Mod-
erate Strong
Post-Market
Require Needed
Monitoring and Testing Weak None None None Weak None Strong Weak
Mod-
erate
Require Timely Adverse
Event Reporting None None None None Weak None Strong None Strong
Inspect Facilities 
and Safety Records Weak
Mod-
erate Moderate Moderate
Mod-
erate Moderate Strong Strong Strong
Remove Unsafe
Products from Market Moderate
Mod-
erate Moderate Strong
Mod-
erate Strong Strong Strong Strong
16. See http://www.nanotechproject.org/consumerproducts, accessed September 27, 2006. Unless otherwise noted,
subsequent examples of nanotechnology products are drawn from this website, which is maintained by the
Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies and contains an inventory of manufacturer self-identified consumer
products that make express or implied claims for the incorporation of engineered nanomaterials or other appli-
cations of nanotechnology.
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preliminary data from Japan indicate an addi-
tional 87 cosmetics are on the market in that
country alone, some of which are sure to end
up in global commerce and be subject to the
U.S. regulatory system.17 On the other hand,
as was analyzed in J. Clarence Davies January
2006 report Managing the Effects of
Nanotechnology, FDA’s legal tools for regulat-
ing cosmetics are among the most limited.
The ensuing analysis of FDA’s approach to
nanotechnology cosmetics is complicated,
however, by FDA’s creative use of its legal
tools and a longstanding industry self-regula-
tory program for cosmetic ingredient safety.
With the exception of color ingredients, the
FDC Act gives FDA no explicit authority for
pre-market oversight of cosmetic ingredients
or cosmetic products.18 FDA has only the
standard post-market authorities, including
the right to inspect manufacturing facilities
and seek court action against unsafe or oth-
erwise unlawful products, and can take court
enforcement action if a product’s labeling is
false, misleading or otherwise misbranded.
This level of oversight and grant of legal
authority occurred in the1938 FDC Act and
was based on the assumption that cosmetics
(defined to include only products that
cleanse, beautify, promote attractiveness or
alter appearance) are products that are prima-
rily applied externally, do not affect the
“structure or function” of the body in a
drug-like way and thus are not likely to pose
significant safety concerns.
In the 1970s, as the array of cosmetic
ingredients expanded, the potential for der-
mal absorption, allergic responses and other
possible hazards was recognized. FDA made
creative use of the aforementioned misbrand-
ing authority to establish a “backdoor” safety
substantiation requirement for cosmetics.
FDA issued a regulation declaring that ingre-
dients and products that had not been “ade-
quately substantiated for safety prior to mar-
keting” would be deemed misbranded unless
they bear this warning statement:“Warning –
The safety of this product has not been
determined.”19 Few if any marketed cosmetic
products bear such a warning, implying that
their safety has been substantiated based on
appropriate testing or other relevant data.
FDA does not, however, have authority to
access or review the company’s substantiation
data or other safety-related records.
To support industry compliance with the
substantiation requirement, the Cosmetic,
Toiletry, and Fragrance Association (CTFA),
which is the principal cosmetic industry
trade association, established the Cosmetic
Ingredient Review (CIR) in collaboration
with FDA and the Consumer Federation of
America.20 Funded by CTFA but independ-
ently operated, the CIR conducts and pub-
lishes scientific reviews on the safety of cos-
metic ingredients. The CIR reported in
Nanotechnology Cosmetics 
in the Marketplace
As of October 2006, a search of the Project on
Emerging Nanotechnologies nanotechnology consumer
product inventory returned 58 specific and general nan-
otechnology cosmetic products from nine countries,
along with 40 products categorized as personal-care
products. Many of these cosmetics are designed to be
applied to the hair, mouth, eyes, hands and body and
are available in cream, spray, liquid and powder forms. 
17. See http://staff.aist.go.jp/kishimoto-atsuo/nano/index.htm, accessed September 27, 2006.
18. See 21 USC 361 et seq.
19. See 21 CFR 740.10.
20. See the CIR website at http://www.cir-safety.org/, accessed September 27, 2006.
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August 2006 that 1,300 ingredients have
been assessed to date, which it says covers
two-thirds of the ingredients most com-
monly used in cosmetics today. Ingredients
passing CIR review are deemed by FDA and
the industry to satisfy FDA’s safety substanti-
ation requirement.
The CIR is generally regarded as a suc-
cessful program, as far as it goes, and, as a cat-
egory, cosmetics are not a major public
health concern. The program is voluntary,
however, and ingredients that have not gone
through the process are beyond FDA’s over-
sight unless and until they are suspected of
causing harm.To date, no engineered nano-
materials have gone through the process, but
presumably, they will be subject to it at some
point in the future.
Another program that addresses safety
concerns associated with cosmetics is the
Voluntary Cosmetic Registration Program
(VCRP).As noted on its website,VCRP is an
FDA post-market reporting system for use by
manufacturers, packers and distributors of
cosmetic products that are in commercial dis-
tribution in the United States. It involves
registering cosmetic-manufacturing estab-
lishments and ingredients using the Cosmetic
Product Ingredient Statements (CPIS).21 In
January 2007, CTFA will launch a Consumer
Commitment Code, under which companies
pledge to make their safety dossiers on cos-
metic ingredients available to FDA upon the
agency’s request.22
With this as background, I provide below
my judgments about the relative strength of
FDA’s legal tools for regulating nanotechnol-
ogy cosmetic products.
Pre-Market Functions
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on
Products in the Pipeline – None. Because
there is no requirement for FDA pre-market
review and no other incentive or require-
ment for companies to disclose their
research or product development activity,
FDA has no legal basis for obtaining this
information from them.23 This is an impor-
tant issue in the nanotechnology cosmetic
arena because of genuine uncertainty about
the actual composition and properties of
ingredients that are claimed on cosmetic
product labels to be produced through or
otherwise incorporate the benefits of nan-
otechnology.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing Require-
ments – Weak. The cosmetic industry
deserves credit for the CIR, which is in part
a response to FDA’s substantiation “require-
ment.”As a matter of FDA’s legal authority,
however, this functional element is rated
weak because the safety substantiation is
legally optional, the CIR is voluntary and
administered beyond FDA’s legal control
and cosmetic products bearing nanotech-
nology claims are on the market without
FDA review or knowledge about their actu-
al composition or safety-related properties.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Weak. FDA’s authorities are
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21. See http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~dms/cos-regn.html, accessed September 27, 2006.
22.“CTFA Launches Package of Consumer-Oriented Industry Initiatives at 2006 Annual Meeting.”Washington,
DC: Cosmetic,Toiletry, and Fragrance Association, March 2, 2006.Available at http://www.ctfa.org/, accessed 
September 27, 2006.
23. FDA is free to conduct its own research to discover this information, but its capacity to do so is heavily affected
by resource constraints, as discussed more fully below.
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deemed weak on this element for the same
reasons as above, as well as the fact that a
product cannot be removed from the mar-
ket unless FDA can prove that it is poten-
tially injurious or that its safety has not
been adequately substantiated.
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
None. FDA has no authority to obtain and
review cosmetic ingredient or product safe-
ty data prior to market entry.
Post-Market Functions
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – Weak. FDA has no explicit
authority to require post-market monitor-
ing or testing for safety or any other pur-
pose. FDA’s safety substantiation regulation
contemplates that when a safety question
arises post-marketing the company will
conduct adequate studies to resolve the
question, but FDA’s legal capacity in this
regard is weak for the same reasons that its
capacity to enforce safety and testing
requirements pre-market is weak.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – None. FDA has no legal author-
ity for this purpose.
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Weak. FDA can inspect facilities, but it has
no access to records, other than as provided
voluntarily by companies.
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Moderate. FDA has the standard
judicial enforcement tools to take a cosmet-
ic product off the market if it can prove it
contains a substance that “may render it inju-
rious to users.” FDA has no mandatory recall
authority for cosmetics, but, because of
FDA’s power to warn consumers and make
other use of publicity when it has concern,
the agency typically has good success in
obtaining the voluntary recall of products
when it brings a safety concern to the atten-
tion of a company.
Whole Foods
Overview
This category includes whole food articles
such as fruits, vegetables and fish, as opposed
to ingredients or intentionally added sub-
stances, such as oils, sweeteners, preserva-
tives, color additives and animal drug and
pesticide residues. It is included in this
analysis not because the regulatory regime
for whole foods is likely to play a role in the
oversight of engineered nanomaterials and
products, but rather as the starting point for
understanding the complicated range of
approaches Congress and FDA have taken to
the regulation of substances in or affecting
the food supply.
Whole foods are subject only to post-
market oversight and to two different safety
standards, depending on whether the sub-
stance that raises a safety concern is natural-
ly occurring in the food or “added” inadver-
tently by some human activity.24 In the for-
mer case, such as the naturally occurring
toxin solanine in potatoes, the food can be
removed from the market only if FDA can
prove that it is “ordinarily injurious” to
health. Added substances, such as dioxins,
mercury and lead, make food “adulterated”
and thus unlawful in commerce if FDA can
prove that the substance is present at a level
that “may render” the food “injurious to
health.” This reflects the congressional
24. See 21 USC 342(a).
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judgment that human interventions are sub-
ject to a higher safety standard than nature,
as will be illustrated further in the discussion
below of GRAS food ingredients, food addi-
tives and food packaging.
The one arguable exception to the lack of
pre-market oversight for whole foods is FDA’s
policy for regulating genetically modified
whole foods derived from plants,which is dis-
cussed below under “GRAS Food
Ingredients” and not included in the analysis
that follows.
Pre-Market Functions
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on Products
in the Pipeline – None.There is, of course, no
“pipeline” for most whole foods and all
unintentional contaminants and no legal tool
for obtaining “early warning” information.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – None. FDA has no pre-mar-
ket legal authority over whole foods.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – None. FDA has no pre-market
legal authority over whole foods.
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
None. FDA has no pre-market legal author-
ity over whole foods.
Post-Market Goals
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – None. FDA has no authority to
impose monitoring or testing requirements
on parties marketing whole foods or other-
wise bearing responsibility for the presence
of unintended contaminants in foods.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – None. FDA has no authority to
require adverse event reporting, although
FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition (CFSAN) operates a voluntary
Adverse Event Reporting System (CAERS).
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Moderate. FDA can inspect facilities
where whole foods are processed and stored,
collect samples for testing and access safety-
related records if it has a “reasonable belief”
that the food “presents a threat of adverse
health consequences or death.”25
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Moderate. FDA has the standard
judicial enforcement tools that work effec-
tively when FDA can prove that the applica-
ble safety standard has been violated. The
recall system, though voluntary, normally
works well to remove products from the
market when FDA can demonstrate an
immediate safety concern.
Dietary Supplements
Overview
The nanotechnology consumer product
inventory cites numerous examples of dietary
supplement products that claim the use of
nanomaterials or otherwise refer to nanotech-
nology in their product claims. It is impossible
to know what these claims actually mean, but
the suggestion often is that the nanosize of
particular materials enhances their absorbabil-
ity or other functional properties.
Prior to 1994, the safety of dietary sup-
plement ingredients was subject to
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25. In the case of seafood and juice products, FDA has issued regulations requiring processors to implement
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points) systems. Based on those regulations, FDA has access to
certain records related to the design and operation of such systems. See 21 CFR Parts 120 and 123.
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regulation by FDA on the same basis as any
intentionally added food substance, which
meant that FDA could require pre-market
approval as a food additive if the supplement
ingredient were not generally recognized as
safe (or GRAS). Under the Dietary
Supplement Health and Education Act
(DSHEA), Congress excluded supplement
ingredients from the definition of food addi-
tive, shifting to FDA the burden of proof
regarding the safety of a wide range of sup-
plements on the market at the time, includ-
ing vitamins, minerals, herbs and other
botanicals, amino acids and any other sub-
stance used to supplement the diet and con-
sumed in pill or other supplement form.26
FDA has no pre-market authority over such
supplements, but can take court enforcement
action to remove them from the market if
the agency can prove they “present a signifi-
cant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”
For supplements containing “new” ingre-
dients—meaning ones with no history of
use in supplement products and no presence
in the food supply in the same chemical form
—DSHEA requires the sponsor to submit a
pre-market notification providing informa-
tion that the sponsor believes the products
“will reasonably be expected to be safe.”
Pre-Market Functions 
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on
Products in the Pipeline – None. FDA has no
legal tool for accessing information on new
technologies and products under develop-
ment in the supplement industry, and,
because most new supplement products are
formulated using ingredients that were used
in supplements prior to DSHEA, few com-
panies have any need or incentive to bring
such information to FDA.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – Weak. FDA’s authority in
this regard applies only to new dietary
ingredients and, even for these, does not
empower FDA to establish testing require-
ments or a true safety standard.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Weak. Likewise, the only pre-
market safety burden applies to new ingre-
dients, and the requirement is not to
demonstrate safety but only to provide the
information on the basis of which the man-
ufacturer concludes that the product “will
reasonably be expected to be safe.”
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
Weak. FDA’s receipt of pre-market notifi-
cations provides FDA some information
but it does not provide the basis for a full
FDA safety review, and FDA is not empow-
ered to block marketing on the basis that it
considers the notification inadequate.27
Post-Market Goals
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – None. FDA has no authority to
Nanotechnology Dietary Supplements 
As of October 2006, a search of the Project on
Emerging Nanotechnologies consumer product invento-
ry returned 16 dietary supplements that claim the use of
nanoscale calcium, magnesium and silver to increase
the bioavailability of supplements in the body.
26. See 21 USC 321(ff), 342 (f) and 350b.
27. See 21 CFR Part 190.
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require post-marketing monitoring and test-
ing of dietary supplement ingredients or
products.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – None. FDA has no authority
for this purpose, though CFSAN’s volun-
tary reporting system, CAERS, applies to
supplements.
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Moderate. FDA can inspect facilities
where supplements are processed and
stored, collect samples for testing and access
safety-related records if it has a “reasonable
belief ” that the food “presents a threat of
adverse health consequences or death.”
DSHEA gave FDA authority to establish
GMP requirements for supplements, which
presumably would include some record-
keeping and access requirements, but the
required regulations have not been issued.
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Moderate. FDA’s legal capacity
here is similar to that for whole foods,
which means FDA can go to court to
remove a supplement product from the
market if it can prove a significant or unrea-
sonable risk of illness or injury. For new
dietary ingredients, FDA can go to court if
it can prove there is inadequate information
to provide reasonable assurance that the
ingredient does not present a significant or
unreasonable risk.28 The voluntary recall
system is also available.
GRAS Food Ingredients
Overview
The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies
consumer products inventory lists products
“powered by nanotechnology” or “utilizing
the incredible new nanotechnology” to
improve the properties of frying oil and the fla-
vor of cocoa, and a September 2006 report by
Jennifer Kuzma and Peter VerHage,
Nanotechnology in Agriculture and Food
Production:Anticipated Applications, offers further
documentation that nanotechnology is on its
way to the food supply. Similarly, the Helmut
Kaiser Consultancy estimates that the nan-
otechnology food market is growing rapidly
and will reach over $20 billion by 2010—
about three times its current size.29 A recent
study by Cientifica found over 150 nanotech-
nology applications currently in the food
industry, with some of the world’s biggest
companies—such as Altria, Nestle, Kraft,
Heinz and Unilever—involved in nanotech-
nology research and development.30 These
findings make the system for regulating
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Nanotechnology and Food
An online database categorizing the anticipated applica-
tions of nanotechnology in agriculture and food production
found 160 projects that cover a wide range of research
areas, topics and techniques, including bioprocessing for
food, pathogen and contamination detection and smart
treatment and delivery systems. The database is availaible
at http://www.nanotechnology.org/inventories.
28. See 21 USC 342(f).
29.“Study: Nanotechnology in Food and Food Processing Worldwide 2003-2006-2010-2015.”Tübingen,
Germany: Helmut Kaiser Consultancy, 2006.Available at http://www.hkc22.com/nanofood.html, accessed
September 27, 2006.
30. Nanotechnologies in the Food Industry. London, UK: Cientifica,August 2006.Available at http://www.cientifica.com/
www/details.php?id=47, accessed September 27, 2006; Sean Roach.“Most Companies Will Have to Wait Years for
Nanotech’s Benefits.” FoodProductionDaily.com,August 21, 2006.Available at http://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/
news/ng.asp?n=69974-nanotechnology-packaging-nano-applications, accessed September 27, 2006.
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substances used in food processing and packag-
ing, including GRAS substances, food additives
and food packaging, important to our analysis
of FDA’s nanotechnology regulatory tools.
GRAS food ingredients are regulated
under a legal system established by Congress
in 1958 to ensure the safety of intentional
food additives through careful pre-market
testing and FDA review, while avoiding time-
consuming and costly FDA review of inten-
tionally added substances whose safety is
already well established. It thus excludes from
the definition of “food additive” and from the
pre-market approval requirement intentional-
ly added substances that are “generally recog-
nized as safe” by scientists based on a history
of safe use in food prior to 1958 or “scientif-
ic procedures,” which means the same quan-
tity and quality of evidence required to
demonstrate the safety of a food additive.
By law, there is no requirement for a
company that considers its food substance
GRAS to inform FDA of its marketing
plans or seek any FDA review. If a company
markets based on its “independent” GRAS
determination, however, FDA can challenge
that determination in court on the grounds
that the substance is not GRAS and thus is
an unapproved (and thereby unlawful) food
additive. To help avoid such disputes, FDA,
shortly after enactment of the food additive
law, issued extensive lists of substances it
considers GRAS,31 and, in the 1970s, initiat-
ed a GRAS review program that involved
extensive literature reviews and the promul-
gation of often detailed regulations, includ-
ing chemical specifications, for additives that
FDA has affirmed as GRAS.32 In addition to
these FDA efforts, commercial customers
typically demand from their suppliers
documentation that an ingredient or food
substance is either FDA approved as a food
additive or GRAS. In the absence of a spe-
cific GRAS listing by FDA, companies fre-
quently commission panels of scientists to
review the available evidence and render a
judgment about GRAS status.
This system generally works very well to
assure the safety of substances intentionally
added to food. One of its great strengths from
a public health and public confidence per-
spective is that it places the burden to prove
safety on the sponsor rather than FDA.Thus,
when challenging an independent GRAS
determination, FDA need not prove harm
but only that safety is not generally recog-
nized; the approval of a food additive can be
revoked based solely on an FDA showing that
there is an unresolved safety question.
The 1958 food additive amendments to
the FDC Act were also intended to foster
innovation in food technology by providing
a basis for public confidence in the safety of
marketed additives. The innovation goal is
also evident in the balance struck by inclu-
sion of the GRAS concept. However, the
GRAS concept raises an issue, at least from a
public confidence perspective, because of its
reliance on the judgment of the sponsor as
to whether or not a new substance—or a
new form or use of a substance—requires
FDA approval. Even when FDA has issued
GRAS (or food additive) regulations that
appear applicable to the substance, there is
room for the exercise of judgment as to
whether the substance is covered. For exam-
ple, the chemical specifications in FDA’s reg-
ulations are typically written without regard
to material size, leaving open the question of
whether a nanoscale version would be
31. See 21 CFR Part 182.
32. See 21 CFR Parts 184 and 186.
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covered. In addition, it is almost certainly the
case that the safety evaluation underlying the
regulation would not have considered the
effects at the nanoscale.
In the late 1980s, agricultural biotechnol-
ogy presented FDA an analogous challenge
grounded in the food additive-GRAS
regime’s inherent flexibility. In 1992, FDA
established a policy for oversight of geneti-
cally modified and other “novel,” plant-
derived whole foods. The policy consisted
largely of scientific guidance concerning the
determination of whether the genetic modi-
fication resulted in a compositional change
sufficient to trigger regulation as a food addi-
tive.33 It also included a voluntary pre-market
notification procedure under which develop-
ers of such foods could submit information
to FDA supporting their judgment that no
such change had occurred and thus that the
novel food was “substantially equivalent” to
its traditional counterpart.
FDA’s biotechnology food policy was an
effort to clarify the pre-market safety assess-
ment and approval obligations of product
developers and provide an incentive for
companies to submit information to FDA in
advance of marketing, despite the lack of
any legal requirement that they do so for
products they considered GRAS and thus
not food additives. This system has worked
well to provide FDA with information
about genetically modified (GM) foods
entering the marketplace, none of which has
experienced known safety problems. The
system does not, however, include a full
FDA safety review or conclusion about the
safety of new products, which has been a
factor in the lack of confidence among
some U.S. consumers and many in Europe
about the safety of GM foods.
Pre-Market Functions
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on
Products in the Pipeline – Weak. FDA has no
legal tool for accessing information on new
technologies and products under develop-
ment in the food industry. FDA’s gatekeep-
er role under the food additive-GRAS
regime gives companies some incentive to
provide information during their develop-
ment process, but the flexibility of the
GRAS concept reduces the incentive, and
FDA typically gets detailed information
about new technologies only when compa-
nies are ready or close to ready to market
them or submit them for approval.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – Moderate. Even with the
flexibility in the GRAS concept, the laws,and
FDA’s enforcement leverage, if FDA disagrees
with an independent GRAS determination,
it has reasonably good capacity to set and
enforce safety and testing standards. Over the
years, FDA has provided considerable guid-
ance on the testing required to show the safe-
ty of GRAS substances and food additives.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Moderate. As the GRAS concept
is written and implemented, sponsors have
the ultimate burden to prove safety, which
most take very seriously despite their legal
flexibility to make an independent GRAS
judgment.
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
Weak. By definition, GRAS substances are
not required to go through an FDA pre-mar-
ket review, though in some cases sponsors
have sought GRAS affirmation from FDA
prior to marketing.
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Post-Market Functions
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – None. FDA has no authority to
require post-market monitoring and testing
of GRAS food ingredients.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – None. FDA has no authority for
this purpose, though CFSAN’s voluntary
reporting system, CAERS, applies to GRAS
ingredients.
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Moderate. FDA can inspect facilities
where GRAS ingredients are processed and
stored, collect samples for testing and access
safety-related records if it has a “reasonable
belief” that the substance “presents a threat
of adverse health consequences or death.”
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Strong. FDA’s capacity in this
regard is strong because, in addition to hav-
ing all the standard enforcement tools, it
need only prove that a safety question exists
or that safety is not “generally recognized.”
Food Additives
Overview
As outlined above, substances intentionally
added to food—such as spices, flavors, preser-
vatives, emulsifiers and sweeteners—are food
additives, unless they are GRAS, and are
required to go through a formal FDA safety
review and approval process.34 In this process,
the burden of proof is on the sponsor to prove
safety, FDA has full control over testing
requirements, and the safety standard is strict:
“reasonable certainty of no harm.” The
process culminates in a regulation setting the
conditions under which the additive may be
lawfully used.This is a strong and effective sys-
tem for ensuring additives are safe and for
providing the basis for public confidence in
safety. Some argue, however, that it is a deter-
rent to innovation because the standards are
stringent and the process is cumbersome, cost-
ly and legalistic.
It should be noted that there are other
categories of intentionally added substances
that are regulated under different sections of
the FDC Act, such as color additives,35 animal
drug residues36 and pesticide residues.37 The
standards and procedures vary in detail but
are substantially the same as for food addi-
tives. Color additives and animal drug
residues are regulated by FDA. The
Environmental Protection Agency evaluates
the safety of pesticide residues in food and
sets tolerances (or legal limits) on the amount
that may be present; FDA enforces the pesti-
cide tolerances.
Pre-Market Functions 
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on Products
in the Pipeline – Weak. FDA has no legal tool
for accessing information on new technolo-
gies and products under development in the
food industry, but FDA’s gatekeeper role for
food additives provides companies with some
incentive to provide information during their
development process, especially when novel
technologies are involved.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – Strong. By virtue of its pre-
market approval authority, FDA has clear
34. See 21 USC 348.
35. See 21 USC 379e.
36. See 21 USC 360b.
37. See 21 USC 346a.
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legal capacity to interpret and apply the
statutory safety standard, including establish-
ing the testing requirements that give the
safety standard its functional meaning.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Strong. As a matter of law, the
burden to prove safety is on the sponsor, and
a food additive cannot be marketed until
FDA concludes that the sponsor has met that
burden.
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
Strong.This is a central attribute of the pre-
market approval system for food additives.
Post-Market Functions
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – Weak. FDA has no authority to
require post-marketing monitoring and
testing of food additives, but on a few occa-
sions FDA has elicited agreements from
sponsors to conduct post-market monitor-
ing as a condition of approval.The enforce-
ability of these agreements is questionable.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – Weak. FDA has no authority
for this purpose, though the occasional
post-market monitoring noted above has
included adverse event reporting, and
CFSAN’s voluntary reporting system,
CAERS, applies to food additives.
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Moderate. FDA can inspect facilities
where food additives are processed and
stored, collect samples for testing, and access
safety-related records if it has a “reasonable
belief ” that the substance “presents a threat
of adverse health consequences or death.”
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Moderate. The strong point of
FDA’s legal capacity in this regard is that it
can revoke a food additive approval regula-
tion based solely on a showing that new
evidence raises an unresolved safety ques-
tion.The weak point is that the administra-
tive process involves formal, trial-like pro-
ceedings that are resource intensive and
time- consuming.
Food Packaging 
Overview
With companies already claiming that they
are using silver “nanoparticles” in food stor-
age containers to keep food fresher and
longer and, in the future, to signal when
foods are spoiled, food packaging and other
food contact materials are among the early
applications of nanotechnology that con-
sumers will encounter directly in the market-
place.The primary FDA regulatory concern
in this arena is that components of the food
contact material may migrate to the food,
posing a safety concern or otherwise
adversely affecting the quality of the food.
Food packaging materials and other food
contact substances that are not GRAS are
included in the statutory definition of “food
additive” and, for most of the years since
1958, have been regulated through the food
additive petition process. The result is an
extensive and detailed list of regulations,
including chemical specifications, prescribing
the conditions under which what FDA calls
“indirect” food additives, in such categories
as adhesives, polymers, adjuvants, production
aids and sanitizers, can be safely and lawfully
used.38 This system has all the strengths of the
food additive system as applied to direct
Regulating the Products of Nanotechnology
38. See 21 CFR Parts 172–178.
37
additives, but with typically a much lower
possibility for human exposure to chemicals
and a lower level of possible safety concern.
Based on wide agreement that this
approach was wasteful of both agency and
industry resources, Congress created, in the
1997 FDA Modernization Act, an alternative
pre-market notification process as an option
for FDA and the industry in the typical case
of low migration and low toxicological con-
cern.39 Under this approach, the sponsor sub-
mits a food contact notification (FCN) con-
taining information prescribed by FDA; FDA
then has 120 days in which to review and
object if it concludes that the food contact
material has not been shown to be safe. If
FDA does not object, The FCN is deemed
“effective” and the material can be marketed
unless FDA later determines that the material
is no longer safe, in which case FDA can
declare the FCN no longer effective, which
revokes its marketing authorization. One dis-
tinct feature of this system is that in contrast
to a food additive regulation, which authoriz-
es use by any manufacturer, a FCN covers use
of a food contact material only by the entity
that submitted it.
Given the relatively small potential for
food safety problems associated with food
contact materials, the old food additive regu-
lation system and the new FCN system both
provide a high degree of assurance that these
materials are safe. Under the old food additive
regulation system, however, engineered nano-
materials will raise the same issue presented
by GRAS substances and food additives:
namely, whether the nanosize form of a pre-
viously approved material is covered by the
existing regulation.This issue would not arise
to the extent manufacturers use the FCN
process because each company must submit
its own FCN on the specific material it
intends to market.
Independent determinations of GRAS
status remain an option for developers of new
packaging or food contact materials, though
the availability of the FCN route reduces the
attractiveness of the GRAS option. If pur-
sued, it raises the same issues as GRAS deter-
minations for any other substance. The fol-
lowing analysis applies to food packaging and
contact materials for which GRAS claims are
not made.
Pre-Market Functions
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on Products
in the Pipeline – Weak. FDA has no legal tool
for accessing information on new technolo-
gies and products under development by the
food packaging industry,but FDA’s gatekeep-
er role under the food additive and FCN
provisions of law provide companies with
some incentive to provide information dur-
ing their development process, especially
when novel technologies are involved.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – Strong. Whether under the
regulation or FCN route, FDA’s strong pre-
market requirements give it clear legal
capacity to enforce the safety standard and
set testing and other data requirements.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Strong. As a matter of law, the
burden to prove safety rests clearly on the
sponsor.
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
Strong. This is the purpose and clear con-
sequence of the legal framework for food
packaging and food contact materials.
39. See 21 USC 348(h) and 21 CFR 170.100 et seq.
38
Post-Market Functions
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – None. FDA has no authority to
require post-market monitoring and test-
ing, and the voluntary agreement approach
that has worked for some direct additives is
not likely of practical relevance to packag-
ing and food contact materials.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – None. FDA has no authority
for this purpose, though CFSAN’s volun-
tary reporting system, CAERS, applies to
food packaging and contact materials.
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Moderate. FDA can inspect facilities
where food additives are processed and
stored, collect samples for testing and access
safety-related records if it has a “reasonable
belief ” that the substance “presents a threat
of adverse health consequences or death.”
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Strong. As in the case of direct
food additives, FDA can revoke a food addi-
tive approval regulation for food contact
materials or deem a FCN no longer effective
without proving harm, only that new evi-
dence raises an unresolved safety question.
Under the FCN route, FDA has the further
advantage of a simple process for deeming an
FCN no longer effective, avoiding the cum-
bersome process required to revoke a food
additive approval regulation.
Medical Devices
Overview
Medical devices have particular potential to
benefit from advances in nanotechnology as
stronger and more highly functional materials
become available for a range of implantable
devices, prostheses and diagnostics. As health
significance and therapeutic benefit increase,
however, so too does the need for vigilance to
assure safety, which for devices involves bal-
ancing the risks and benefits of the device for
the patient.
The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme
that actively addresses the goals of protecting
public health, fostering innovation and pro-
viding the basis for public confidence. The
device amendments provide FDA with a more
complete arsenal of regulatory tools than it has
for any other regulatory category (see Table 1),
including the capacity to tailor the intensive-
ness of pre-market oversight to the nature of
the product, the degree of risk it poses and the
nature of oversight FDA thinks the product
needs to assure safety and effectiveness.
This system is too complicated to describe
in detail here. In a nutshell, however, it
requires that any company seeking to market
a device product for the first time submit that
product for review to FDA unless FDA has
exempted that particular type of product
from this requirement based on a determina-
tion that pre-market review is not needed to
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Nanotechnology Medical Devices 
Using information provided by the NanoBiotech News
2006 Nanomedicine, Device & Diagnostics Report, the
Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies was also able to
estimate commercialization time frames for two sets of
nanotechnology medical applications: cancer-relevant
drugs, diagnostic tests and devices; and general drug
delivery devices. In terms of drug delivery devices, the
Project found 56 products in the pipeline, many of which
are in early-stage development or preclinical testing.
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assure safety and effectiveness. In general,
only the best-understood and lowest-risk
devices are so exempted, and even for these,
the manufacturer must register with FDA
and list its products with the agency.
For all other device products, the sponsor
must submit either a pre-market notification
or a full pre-market approval application,
which, in either case, requires the sponsor to
provide FDA the information it needs to
identify issues of safety and effectiveness and,
if needed, conduct a full-blown pre-market
review of the product’s safety and effective-
ness for its intended use. FDA approval of
new devices, such as ones performing new
functions or incorporating new materials or
other new technology, typically requires clin-
ical testing, which must also be reviewed in
advance by FDA. Under this comprehensive
set of pre-market authorities, the incorpora-
tion of new nanomaterials to alter the func-
tional properties of medical devices will be
subject to careful pre-market review by FDA.
FDA also has extensive post-market regu-
latory tools, including the traditional inspec-
tion and enforcement tools available across
the board at FDA, as well as additional
authorities, such as the authority to mandate
recalls in some cases, require adverse event
reporting and post-market surveillance, man-
date GMPs and have extensive records access.
Many challenging issues have surrounded
FDA’s implementation of the device amend-
ments, many of which result from the large
number of often small companies and the
incredibly rapid pace of innovation. Using its
abundant tools in a way that achieves the dual
goals of protecting public health and foster-
ing innovation is not easy and may well prove
to be a challenge in the case of nanotechnol-
ogy, but FDA does not lack legal tools.
Pre-Market Functions
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on
Products in the Pipeline – Moderate.
Though FDA has no explicit authority to
access company information on technolo-
gies and products under development, its
oversight of clinical investigations and
strong gatekeeper role provide companies a
strong incentive to provide FDA with
information on novel technologies well
ahead of commercialization.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – Strong. FDA’s strong and
flexible pre-market oversight tools provide
ample authority and practical leverage to
interpret and enforce the risk-benefit safe-
ty standard.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Strong. The burden to prove
safety rests as a general matter on the spon-
sor, unless FDA has made its own judgment
on the safety and effectiveness of a particu-
lar type of device and exempted it from the
pre-market submission requirements.
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
Strong. FDA has full but flexible authori-
ty to conduct pre-market safety reviews as
needed.
Post-Market Functions
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – Strong. FDA has explicit authori-
ty to require post-market surveillance for
devices whose failure would be reasonably
likely to have serious health consequences.40
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – Strong. FDA has explicit and
40. See 21 USC 360l and 21 CFR Part 822.
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broad authority to require adverse event
reporting for devices.41
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Strong. FDA has broad authority to
inspect device manufacturers, including for
compliance with mandatory GMPs, and to
require the provision of agency access to
records related to assuring the safety and
effectiveness of devices.
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Strong. FDA can effectively with-
draw a company’s marketing authorization,
whether granted under the pre-market
notification or full pre-market approval
route, based on new information raising a
significant safety question,42 and it has a
broad range of other post-market remedies,
including mandatory recall authority, to deal
with emergent safety problems.
OTC Drugs
Overview
In general, FDA regulates human pharmaceu-
tical products under a comprehensive set of
pre-market and post-market controls. The
FDC Act defines the term “drug” broadly to
include products that diagnose, treat and pre-
vent disease, as well as those that affect the
structure or function of the body for other
purposes (not including food purposes). Any
“new drug” must be approved on an individ-
ual product basis prior to marketing. In a man-
ner similar to the food additive provisions of
the FDC Act, however, products are excluded
from the definition of “new drug” if they are
“generally recognized as safe and effective”
(GRAS/GRAE) for their intended use.43
To implement the GRAS/GRAE ele-
ment of the FDC Act and address the regu-
latory status of OTC drugs, FDA initiated in
1972 a monograph system under which FDA
reviews the safety and effectiveness of active
ingredients and issues regulations listing—by
category of intended OTC uses—the ingre-
dients that can lawfully be incorporated in
drug products based on FDA’s conclusion
that they are generally recognized as safe and
effective for their intended uses.44 Most OTC
drugs are regulated under this system.
Products formulated using these “mono-
graphed” active ingredients and “safe and
suitable” inactive ingredients, and labeled in
accordance with the monograph, are not
considered “new drugs” and thus are not sub-
ject to the requirement for a new drug appli-
cation and the issuance of a product-specific
approval as a prerequisite for marketing. On
the other hand, as a general rule, FDA con-
siders any drug not covered by a monograph
to be a “new drug.”
Nanotechnology in Sunscreens 
As of October 2006, a search of the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies Consumer Product Inventory contained
18 specific and generic nanotechnology sunscreens from
the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. 
41. See 21 USC 360i and 21 CFR Part 803.
42. FDA does not have explicit statutory authority to administratively revoke marketing authorizations granted
under the pre-market notification procedure, but it has on occasion issued revocation letters and has ample
other post-market authorities to remove such products from the market, including publicity, if it believes there
is a safety concern.
43. See 21 USC 321(g) and (p) and 21USC 355.
44. See 21 CFR Part 330 et seq.
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In addition to these basic provisions defin-
ing the terms of market access for drugs, the
FDC Act gives FDA a range of other pre-
market and post-market authorities (see Table
1), including company registration and prod-
uct listing, oversight of clinical trials, manda-
tory GMPs, adverse event reporting for “new
drugs” and access to company records related
to product safety.The drug provisions of the
FDC Act lack some of the post-market
authorities Congress has provided for med-
ical devices, such as comprehensive authority
to require post-market surveillance, but, in
general, the legal tool kit for drug regulation
is strong.
The GRAS/GRAE concept, as imple-
mented through the OTC monograph pro-
gram, gives rise, however, to at least one issue
that will be important to how engineered
nanomaterials are regulated.Like FDA’s GRAS
affirmation regulations for food substances, the
OTC monographs typically list active ingredi-
ents by name and may include purity and other
specifications (often incorporating by reference
standards adopted by the U.S. Pharmacopeia),
but ordinarily without reference to material
size.Thus, it becomes a matter of interpretation
whether a nanoscale version of a listed ingredi-
ent is properly considered within the mono-
graph and thus lawful to market.
This issue has already arisen in a petition by
the International Center for Technology
Assessment (ICTA) filed with FDA regarding
the sunscreen monograph, which lists titanium
dioxide as an active ingredient.45 When
reduced to very small size, titanium dioxide
continues to provide protection from ultravio-
let light but it does not scatter light and thus
becomes clear on the skin (rather than white),
which is cosmetically advantageous. While
companies are using “micronized” materials of
titanium dioxide, which FDA has said fall
within the monograph, they are also releasing
products that are making “nano” claims.
“Micronization” refers to a process of grinding
materials down rather than a particle-size clas-
sification, and may or may not lead to the pro-
duction of nanosize particles. Since FDA has
not precisely defined the term “micronize,” it is
not clear exactly what size materials are being
used in the marketplace or whether they pose
safety questions different from those addressed
in establishing the monograph.
Pre-Market Functions
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on
Products in the Pipeline – Weak. FDA has no
legal tool for accessing information on
new technologies and products under
development by the OTC drug industry,
but the need to comply with the OTC
monograph system gives companies some
incentive to provide information during
the development process, especially when
novel technologies are involved.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – Strong. The OTC mono-
graph system, backed up by the FDC Act’s
new drug authority, provides FDA ample
authority to set and enforce safety stan-
dards and testing requirements.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Strong. If FDA believes there is
an unresolved safety question about an
approved OTC ingredient, it can propose
to amend the monograph on that basis,
effectively shifting the burden to prove
safety to the product sponsor(s) either
through the OTC rule-making process or
new drug approval process.
45. See 21 CFR Part 352.
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• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
Moderate. Individual OTC product formu-
lations that are within a monograph are not
required to be submitted for review by FDA,
but “monographed” active ingredients have
all been reviewed for safety and effectiveness
by FDA through the monograph process.
Post-Market Functions
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – Weak. FDA has no explicit legal
authority to require post-market monitor-
ing and testing of monographed OTC drug
products, though, in the event of a safety
question, it can use the possibility of
removing an ingredient from the mono-
graph as a tool for eliciting information
from manufacturers.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – None. FDA has no explicit
legal authority to require adverse event
reporting by manufacturers of mono-
graphed OTC drug products and does not
do so.
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records
– Strong. FDA can inspect manufacturing
facilities, including for compliance with
mandatory GMPs, and can access records
related to product safety.
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Strong. FDA can, through rule-
making, remove an active ingredient from
the monograph based solely on a showing
that available data no longer demonstrate
safety.
New Drugs
Overview
New drugs (both pioneer or brand name
and generic) require approval by FDA
through the new drug application (NDA)
process, or abbreviated NDA (ANDA) for
generics.This process results in a company-
and product-specific approval to market the
product in accordance with conditions and
under a detailed label approved by FDA.
FDA is empowered to oversee human-safety
and efficacy testing of new drugs and to
require prior to marketing the submission of
extensive information on all aspects of a
drug’s composition, safety and effectiveness.
FDA thus has ample legal authority to
address any safety question that might arise
pre-market with respect to the application of
nanotechnology.
FDA also has considerable post-market
authority, as outlined in Table 1 and below,
though its lack of broad authority to require
post-market surveillance and testing has been
cited recently by the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) as a gap in
FDA’s authority that affects oversight of drug
product safety.46
Nanotechnology in Pharmaceuticals
In its submitted comments to FDA, the Project on Emerging
Nanotechnologies has identified at least nine currently
available nanotechnology drug and drug delivery prod-
ucts that have already been approved for use by FDA.
Many of these drugs are designed to more effectively tar-
get and treat a range of diseases, from high cholesterol
to breast cancer, and cause fewer side effects.
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46. Drug Safety: Improvement Needed in FDA’s Postmarket Decision-making and Oversight Process. Washington, DC:
United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-06-402, March 2006.Available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf, accessed September 27, 2006.
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Pre-Market Functions
• Capacity to Obtain Early Information on Products
in the Pipeline – Moderate. Despite the lack
of a specific legal tool for accessing informa-
tion on new technologies and products
under development by the drug industry,
companies facing the NDA process have a
significant incentive to provide FDA with the
information the agency needs to understand
and efficiently review new products especial-
ly when novel technologies are involved.
• Capacity to Enforce Safety and Testing
Requirements – Strong. The NDA process
gives FDA complete authority in this regard.
• Capacity to Place Burden to Prove Safety on
Sponsor – Strong. The NDA process places
the burden of proof on safety on the appli-
cant, and, if a safety question arises post-
approval, the burden rests on the NDA hold-
er to resolve it.
• Capacity to Review Safety Prior to Marketing –
Strong. No new drug can enter the market
without FDA approval.
Post-Market Functions
• Capacity to Require Needed Monitoring and
Testing – Moderate. As reflected in Table 1,
FDA has clear legal authority to require post-
market testing for safety only in limited cir-
cumstances, involving primarily follow-up
on expedited approval of lifesaving drugs
based on surrogate end points and testing of
approved drugs for use by children.
Nevertheless, FDA’s strong leverage through
the NDA process provides companies an
incentive to produce data FDA thinks are
necessary to sustain continued approval of a
marketed drug.
• Capacity to Require Timely Adverse Event
Reporting – Strong. FDA has clear authori-
ty to require adverse event reporting for
new drugs.
• Capacity to Inspect Facilities and Safety Records –
Strong. FDA can inspect manufacturing
facilities, including for compliance with
mandatory GMPs, and can access records
related to product safety.
• Capacity to Remove Unsafe Products from the
Market – Strong. FDA can revoke approval
of an NDA based on a showing that safety
and effectiveness are no longer demonstrat-
ed, and NDA holders typically respond vol-
untarily once FDA concludes revocation is
necessary.
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FDA’s legal tools are essential to its success, but
they are not sufficient in and of themselves.
They need to be well implemented, which
takes human and financial resources.The harsh
budget reality at FDA, however, is that the
agency’s resources are in steady decline in rela-
tion to the responsibilities it has been given to
do, and the resources it does have are spoken
for, mostly by programs and activities that are
commanded by law or public health priority.
FDA simply lacks any significant cushion of
resources it can draw upon when new chal-
lenges arise.To its credit, FDA is doing things
to prepare for and respond to the challenge of
nanotechnology,but the scarcity of resources is
a severe constraint on the agency’s ability to
do what it needs to do to meet the public’s
expectations.
In this section, I will outline some of the
things FDA needs to be doing now and in
the near future to prepare for and effectively
oversee the coming wave of nanotechnology
products; describe the current state of FDA’s
budget and what FDA is doing within that
budget; and make a few points about the
consequences of not having enough
resources to do the job.
What FDA Needs To Do 
Meeting public expectations regarding the
regulation of nanotechnology or any novel
technology requires both preparation and
action. The preparatory steps FDA should
take involve, generally, building its knowl-
edge base, expertise and technical tool kit,
and, on that basis, developing guidance for
companies that will be seeking to understand
and meet FDA’s requirements. Examples of
such preparatory activities include:
• Learning more about applications of nanotech-
nology that are in the pipeline or market. The
purpose here is to be able to understand for
planning purposes the kinds of nanotech-
nology applications that are likely to be
coming so that safety and regulatory issues
can be identified and prepared for and the
agency can assure the public that it is on
top of this emerging field. This could
involve scientific intelligence gathering
through public sources, surveys of firms and
academic researchers, tracking and analysis
of products on the market and direct out-
reach to leading companies. It should
encompass all areas covered by the
agency—drugs, biological products, cos-
metics, medical devices and foods.
• Developing the necessary in-house scientific
expertise to understand and evaluate the products
of nanotechnology. FDA already has much
general expertise in fields related to nan-
otechnology—in chemistry, physics, mate-
rial science and engineering—but the nov-
elty of the technology and its rapid advance
will demand specialized expertise FDA
does not have in-house. Meeting this need
will require a combination of training and
new hiring, both of which are expensive.
• Developing the safety evaluation and analytical
tools required to assess particular nanotechnology
products. This may be FDA’s most resource
intensive and critical need. It will be
resource intensive because these tools will
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have to be built on a foundation of research
and experimentation. For example, the cur-
rent battery of in vitro models, animal
bioassays and clinical trial methods used for
chemical safety testing assume convention-
al and much larger material size, with doses
being measured in mass per unit of body
weight or similar measures. For nanoscale
materials, which are thought capable of
going places in the body that conventional
materials cannot reach and behaving differ-
ently as a function of their small size, cur-
rent toxicology tools may not be adequate.
Likely, some are and some are not.
Someone has to do the work to know the
difference.
• Developing necessary scientific and regulatory
guidance. In all product categories, clarity by
FDA internally and with product develop-
ers about criteria for product testing, data
submission and review is essential to mak-
ing good public health decisions and facili-
tating innovation. Nanotechnology, like any
new technology, will involve learning by
doing and an evolution in FDA’s under-
standing and requirements. Early effort, in
collaboration with the external scientific
community, to develop guidance that is as
clear as possible will pay big dividends.
In addition to supporting these preparato-
ry activities, FDA needs resources so that it
can take action in the near term to get in
front of future regulatory issues, as well as
address products that are already entering the
market. As discussed in the Recommend-
ation section of this report, cosmetic, sun-
screen and food packaging applications of
nanotechnology are in the market today and
present regulatory issues that flow from
FDA’s lack of an airtight pre-market handle.
FDA could take steps using current legal
authority to get ahead of these issues, though
that would require management and staff
time that are in short supply.
Longer term, as more products emerge and
go through the pre-market approval systems at
FDA, highly expert staffing will be needed in
headquarters and the field if FDA is to provide
meaningful post-market oversight on such
matters as responding to adverse event reports
and conducting GMP inspection.
FDA’s Growing Budget Gap
Where will FDA get the funds for the
preparatory and regulatory actions outlined
above? That question is hard to answer in light
of FDA’s extremely difficult budget situation.
The simple fact is that for at least the past
decade, FDA’s annual appropriation has fallen
short of what the agency would need just to
keep doing what it had been doing the year
before, including continuing the newly man-
dated activities that the administration and
Congress regularly put on FDA’s plate.
According to analyses prepared by FDA,47 the
agency’s 2001 budget would have had to be
26% greater than it was just to stay even with
its 1996 budget. By 2006, this budget gap had
grown to a stunning 49%, meaning that just
to be able to do what it was doing in 1996
and to continue the new activities mandated
since then, FDA’s 2006 budget would have to
have been 49% greater than it is. Under the
President’s proposed 2007 budget for FDA,
the gap grows again to 56%.
This harsh budget reality stems from the
fact that about 80% of FDA’s budget goes for
47.Table presented in connection with FDA briefing for consumer groups on “FDA Financial Realities,” March 10,
2006 (copy on file with author).
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costs directly associated with personnel,
including salary, benefits and rent for office
space and other facilities.These costs rise on
average 5.8% per year for reasons beyond
FDA’s control, such as congressionally man-
dated pay raises and increasing health insur-
ance, rent and other facility costs. Congress,
however, routinely fails to fully fund these
increases, which means that to cover them,
FDA must either reduce staffing levels or
reduce already tight operating budgets—the
money for research, grants and contracts, trav-
el and other activities through which FDA
staff do their current jobs and prepare for new
challenges, such as nanotechnology.
The impact of this resource erosion at FDA
is seen most acutely at its Center for Food
Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN),
which oversees cosmetics as well as the dietary
supplement, food packaging and other food-
related applications of nanotechnology that
are already entering the market. Just since
2003, CFSAN’s total staff has declined from
950 to 850, with a further decline to 817 pro-
jected in 2007.48 At the same time, CFSAN’s
operating budget, which covers a vast array of
food safety and nutrition activities, as well as
cosmetics, has declined from an already-mod-
est $47.5 million to $30 million and is project-
ed to be $25 million in 2007.
As documented in a recent Institute of
Medicine report, FDA’s drug safety program
is another important activity that is ham-
pered by FDA’s widespread scarcity of
resources for activities that are not financed
through the user fee programs recently
enacted to support the new drug and med-
ical device pre-market review programs.49
FDA’s resources are not only increasingly
scarce and shrinking in relation to need, but
they are also already spoken for. The tasks
being performed by FDA staff are deter-
mined by congressional mandate or earmark
—such as the operation of pre-market
approval programs, mandatory GMP inspec-
tions or new initiatives such as bioterrorism
prevention, pandemic preparedness and
drug safety; by activities reflected in FDA’s
own public health priorities, such as blood
safety or preventing food-borne illness; or
by the demands of industry and other exter-
nal constituencies. When a new challenge
such as nanotechnology comes along, FDA’s
managers find their resources already
deployed elsewhere, and they are deployed
for real reasons.
No one would argue that FDA’s current
resource allocation is in any sense perfect, but
anyone who wants FDA to step up its efforts
on nanotechnology has to recognize that that
means taking resources away from some
other activity. There simply is no reserve or
pool of discretionary funds available to man-
agers to respond to new problems.
Shifting resources in response to new
problems is what managers do in any
organization, but FDA is in such a strained
financial situation that absent a nanotech-
nology safety crisis, I believe significant
shifts are unlikely to occur. The problem
with this scenario is that for lack of
resources, FDA may miss the opportunity to
prepare in ways that could help prevent a
crisis and all of the adverse consequences
such a crisis would have for the future of
nanotechnology.
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48. Of these, about 30 “full time equivalents” (“FTEs”) are available to the Office of Cosmetics and Colors, the
great majority of whom work on the statutorily mandated color certification program, leaving only a handful
of employees at CFSAN to oversee the multi-billion dollar cosmetic industry.
49. Institute of Medicine. The Future of Drug Safety – Promoting and Protecting the Health of the Public. Washington,
DC:The National Academies Press, September 2006.
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What FDA Is Doing
To its credit, in traditional FDA fashion,
despite the lack of any new resources or for-
mal reallocation of resources, FDA is not just
sitting back. The Office of Science in the
Office of the Commissioner has been desig-
nated as the focal point for nanotechnology
at FDA, and, along with program staff in
FDA’s operating centers, has been making
presentations to stakeholders about how nan-
otechnology products fit into the agency’s
existing regulatory program.The agency has
a nanotechnology page on its website that
contains information of this kind.50
The Office of Science has also been coor-
dinating several efforts among FDA scientists,
working internally and with other agencies,
to learn more about nanotechnology, devel-
op research agendas and priorities and con-
sider regulatory approaches.
For example, FDA is an active member of
the inter-agency Nanoscale Science,
Engineering, and Technology (NSET) Sub-
committee of the Committee on Technology,
under the National Science and Technology
Council (NSTC). This administration-led
group coordinates among agencies involved
in the development of nanotechnology prod-
ucts. It includes a Nanotechnology Envir-
onment and Health Implications (NEHI)
Working Group, which the FDA representa-
tive chairs.
Internally, FDA has established the FDA
Nanotechnology Interest Group (NTIG),
whose members are review-level scientists
from all the FDA centers.The NTIG consid-
ers the development and approval of nan-
otechnology products through discussions
and sharing of issues that the centers are
experiencing in their discussions with prod-
uct sponsors and review of submissions.The
NTIG meets quarterly and has an invited
outside speaker at each meeting to present to
the group his or her perspective on issues and
approaches to the use of nanotechnology in
development of FDA regulated products.
The FDA Acting Commissioner, Dr.
Andrew C. von Eschenbach, also announced
in August 2006 the creation of the FDA
Nanotechnology Task Force, which is an
internal task force charged with determining
regulatory approaches for nanotechnology
that address innovation, safety and effective-
ness concerns. On October 10, 2006, FDA is
holding a public meeting to seek informa-
tion about the kinds of new nanomaterial-
based products under development in the
product categories FDA regulates and
whether there are emerging scientific issues
that should be brought to FDA’s attention,
including issues related to the safety of engi-
neered nanomaterials.
FDA is also collaborating with outside
bodies on specific issues, including the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) and
National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) on the application of
nanotechnology to cancer diagnosis and
treatment, and with international standard-
setting bodies on the development of termi-
nology, nomenclature, metrology and charac-
terization of nanomaterials.
In addition to these coordination and
dialogue activities, FDA’s centers are con-
ducting a limited program of research relat-
ed to nanotechnology product safety and
effectiveness. FDA is devoting about 16 staff
years and $1 million to this research, much
of which involves the potential for dermal
50. See http://www.fda.gov/nanotechnology/, accessed September 27, 2006.
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penetration by nanoparticles and develop-
ment of methods for assessing the toxicity of
engineered nanomaterials. While seemingly
well targeted and useful, this research is
spread over five FDA centers and is at best a
first step by these centers to build the scien-
tific knowledge needed to regulate engi-
neered nanomaterials.
Unfortunately, the only source of new
research funding for nanotechnology among
federal agencies is the National Nano-
technology Initiative (NNI). The President’s
2007 budget request for the NNI’s research
program is $1.278 billion, of which $44 mil-
lion is allocated to seven agencies for research
on environmental, health and safety
issues.51None of that money is allocated to
FDA, even though a growing number of
nanotechnology-based products fall directly
under FDA’s oversight.
The Consequences 
of Scarce Resources
The internal discussion and coordination, the
public meeting and the research FDA is
undertaking to prepare for nanotechnology
are worthy efforts, but they are limited.They
are the things FDA can do to address a new
challenge when it has no new resources and
no reserve or contingency on which to draw.
These activities involve busy program
managers and staff adding nanotechnology to
the long list of issues for which they are
already responsible. The October 10 public
meeting will help give visibility to nanotech-
nology as an important issue for FDA, but it
is a fairly passive way to build FDA’s knowl-
edge base and will generate only the infor-
mation parties choose and are willing to give
in a public setting, which may or may not be
the information FDA needs.
Finally, FDA deserves credit for reallocat-
ing some of its limited research capacity to
address very immediate safety-related ques-
tions, such as the dermal-absorption proper-
ties of nanotechnology cosmetic ingredients,
but the scale of the effort seems small.
I see two possible, broad consequences of
FDA proceeding at this pace.
1. In product areas where FDA lacks a
strong pre-market review handle,
such as cosmetics, dietary supple-
ments and GRAS food ingredients,
the commercial reality of products
in the marketplace will get too far
ahead of FDA’s knowledge about
what is out there and of its ability to
assure the public that the products
are safe. There is always the possibility
this could result in an actual safety prob-
lem, but there is an equal or greater risk
of undercutting public confidence and
willingness to accept nanotechnology.
Just one visible safety incident with a
marketed product—whether the risk is
real or perceived—is often enough to
prompt the press and public to ask:
Where is FDA? What has it done to
assure the safety of this product?
Unsatisfying answers to those questions
will be a blow to public confidence in
nanotechnology and in FDA.
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51. See National Science and Technology Council.“The National Nanotechnology Initiative – Research and
Development Leading to a Revolution in Technology and Industry, Supplement to the President’s FY 2007
Budget.”Washington, DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, July 2006.The analysis by Maynard (n. 13,
supra) of federal research highly relevant to addressing the health risk of engineered nanomaterials identifies just
$11 million allocated across five agencies in 2005—none of which is associated with FDA.
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2. Products coming through the pre-
market approval systems, such as
food additives, medical devices and
new drugs, will be delayed. To play its
market gatekeeper role in a way that pro-
tects consumers from harm and facilitates
beneficial innovation, FDA needs to know
as much or more about the safety- and
effectiveness-related aspects of nanotech-
nology as do the engineers and other sci-
entists developing it.Without such knowl-
edge, FDA might miss a safety issue, and it
certainly runs the risk of long delays in the
review process. When the regulatory sys-
tem places the burden to prove safety on
product sponsors, ignorance about safety
or how to assess it is almost as much of a
constraint on innovation as actual safety
concerns. If FDA does not have a scientif-
ically sound basis for concluding a product
is safe, the regulatory response will be
either “no”or extended delay until the sci-
entific understanding matures.
In the end, it all comes back to public
expectations for FDA’s role in overseeing the
introduction of nanotechnology products. If
the public expects FDA to have an expert
understanding of the technology and a cred-
ible basis for assuring the safety of nanotech-
nology products before they enter the mar-
ket, this requires resources. If the public
expects a post-market ability to learn active-
ly from actual in-use experience, including
adverse events, and be prepared to act when
problems occur, this, too, requires effort and
resources that FDA would today have trou-
ble mustering.
I think these are the expectations of a
large segment of the American people.With
these expectations in mind, I outline in the
Conclusion and Recommendations sections
some actions FDA could take within its
current authority to help meet them, as well
as some ways in which society, through
Congress, can better equip FDA to do the
job people expect it to do.
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As noted in the Introduction of this report,
nanotechnology could possibly be seen as
just another new technology and another
new challenge for FDA. FDA has managed
its way through such challenges in the past
and, one might argue, will find a way to do
it again. Thus, one could conclude that no
special effort or enhancement of FDA’s
capacities is needed to deal with the emer-
gence of nanotechnology as a commercially
significant technology.
I disagree. Nanotechnology is emerging
rapidly as a potentially transforming technol-
ogy across virtually every product category
FDA regulates. Its enormous potential to
benefit consumers and patients will be real-
ized, however, only if its safety is understood
and reasonably assured and if people have
confidence in its safety. The public expects
FDA to play an active role on both counts.
For these reasons, I think FDA’s capacity
to regulate nanotechnology needs special
attention and action.While FDA has most of
the legal tools it needs to regulate most of the
products of nanotechnology, significant gaps
in authority remain, especially in these areas:
• Pre-Market Oversight of Cosmetics.
Cosmetics, obviously, comprise the product
category for which FDA’s legal arsenal is
most lacking if the agency is to play a mean-
ingful pre-market oversight role rather than
simply react to products and, possibly, prob-
lems after they appear in the marketplace.
While there is currently little, if any, affirma-
tive evidence that the cosmetic products
making nanotechnology-related claims in
the marketplace today are unsafe, there is
also very little information in the public
domain, or available to FDA, about the exact
composition, including material size and
properties, of these claimed nanotechnology
products or about the testing that has been
done to assess their safety.
• Acquiring Information about New
Nanotechnology Products. The ability
to simply acquire information about nano-
materials and nanotechnology products that
are in development or newly in the market
is another gap in FDA’s legal tool kit, but
one that cuts widely across the agency’s pro-
grams. The Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) has authority to request and even
subpoena information to support its unfair
competition investigations, and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
can “call in” data from companies to sup-
port its safety evaluations of pesticides, but
FDA has no legal tools to acquire informa-
tion to help it anticipate safety concerns
about products it will be expected to regu-
late efficiently and effectively.
• Adverse Event Reporting. Likewise,
FDA lacks authority to require adverse
event reporting on marketed products by
manufacturers, except with respect to
medical devices and new drugs.This ham-
pers FDA’s ability to detect patterns and
investigate safety problems that arise post-
market, ideally in time to take the correc-
tive and preventive actions needed to pro-
tect public health and maintain public
confidence.The broad question that needs
consideration with regard to adverse event
reporting and information gathering in
general is how FDA can come to know
what it needs to know in time to do what
it needs to do.
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Conclusion: Gaps in the Tool Kit
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While Congress should consider legislation
to address these and other possible gaps in
authority, FDA’s resource crisis is at least as
great, if not greater, a constraint on the agency’s
ability to meet public expectations as its lack of
legal tools. Whether for research and other
information gathering, providing science-
based guidance to industry or using the legal
tools it has, FDA’s resources are seriously defi-
cient and need sustained attention and
improvement in the coming years to deal
effectively not only with nanotechnology but
also with a host of other public health, innova-
tion and public-confidence challenges.
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The recommendations presented below
include ideas for addressing the gaps in
FDA’s legal authority and resources out-
lined above, thus better equipping FDA to
oversee nanotechnology and other new
technologies over the longer term. I also
see a pressing need for FDA to consider
some near-term actions that it could take,
within its current authority and resources,
to address some of the nanotechnology
products now entering the market and to
demonstrate the agency’s ability to stay
ahead of the product-introduction curve. I
will first recommend some of these short-
er-term actions and then address longer-
term legislative and resource needs.
Each of the recommendations that fol-
low deserves much more analysis and
thought than I have been able to give them
in this overview report, and this list is by no
means exhaustive. My hope with these rec-
ommendations is, first, to illustrate that there
are actions FDA can take, and ways society
can better equip FDA, to meet society’s
expectations, and, second, to stimulate
thinking and debate on these issues.
Near-Term Actions 
My near-term recommendations relate pri-
marily to cosmetics and food-related prod-
uct categories: dietary supplements, GRAS
substances, food additives and food packag-
ing. The central goals are to provide guid-
ance to the industry on some critical ques-
tions that affect the regulatory status and
pathway of many nanotechnology products
and to help FDA obtain the information it
needs to stay abreast of this market and be
prepared for its regulatory job.
Establish Criteria for “New for Legal and
Regulatory Purposes” and “New for Safety
Evaluation Purposes” 
In the end, safety evaluations of engineered
nanomaterials and products involve case-by-
case assessment and judgment. For nanotech-
nology products that do not require individual
product review and approval by FDA,however,
manufacturers often have to make a threshold
determination of whether the product poses a
new safety question or otherwise should be
considered a new or different material, com-
pared with the conventional form.The conven-
tional form may, for example, have been mar-
keted as a dietary supplement or listed in FDA
regulations as a GRAS substance or as an
approved food additive or food contact materi-
al. If the manufacturer judges the nanotechnol-
ogy version to be the same as the listed one,
there is no legal requirement to seek FDA pre-
market review and FDA may not become
aware of the product until after it enters the
market.The burden would then rest on FDA to
determine after the fact whether there is a safe-
ty or regulatory concern warranting action.
FDA should thus promptly provide com-
panies guidance for making what amount to
market-entry decisions.The primary need is
to establish criteria for judging when a nano-
material is “new” for legal and regulatory
purposes, i.e., for purposes of distinguishing
it from versions that are already listed in
FDA’s GRAS, food additive and food pack-
aging regulations or that have been reviewed
through the Cosmetic Ingredient Review
(CIR).The criteria might be based solely on
material size, surface-volume ratios or other
physical characteristics, or they could include
other properties that FDA might judge rele-
vant.This is for FDA to determine.The point
Recommendations
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is to have a basis for companies knowing
when they need to come to FDA prior to
marketing versus when they can rely for legal
and regulatory purposes on the existing
approval, GRAS affirmation or CIR review
of the conventional form of the material.
A necessary extension of clarifying what is
“new” for legal and regulatory purposes
would be to establish criteria for determining
when a nanomaterial should be considered
“new for safety evaluation purposes.” These
criteria presumably would include function-
al properties that relate to the likelihood that
the safety profile of the nanotechnology ver-
sion would be different from the convention-
al one. Such criteria would be helpful for all
categories of FDA-regulated products as a
guide to decisions about the need for toxici-
ty testing beyond what already exists on the
conventional form. Another application of
such criteria might be to narrow the “new”
category so that FDA review of nanotechnol-
ogy versions of already-approved conven-
tional forms would be required when there is
a scientific basis for judging that such review
is needed to ensure safety.
Currently, the science needed to set these
criteria may be lacking, especially to define
when a nanomaterial is “new for safety eval-
uation purposes.” Nevertheless, addressing
these threshold questions, which are at the
heart of determining the regulatory status of
many engineered nanomaterials and the
testing needed to ensure their safety, is fun-
damental to FDA’s job. Moreover, simply
embarking on the process of setting the cri-
teria, which should involve the external sci-
entific community and the industry, would
stimulate necessary discussion and better
definition of the scientific issues that require
further research. Leaving these issues unad-
dressed will foster uncertainty, leave compa-
nies to make their own decisions based on
criteria of their choosing and make orderly
oversight of the rapidly developing market
for nanotechnology products difficult, if not
impossible.
Resolve the Meaning of “Micronized” in
the OTC Sunscreen Monograph
Related to the definition of “new” is the spe-
cific question of what forms of titanium
dioxide are allowed under the OTC drug
monograph for sunscreens. The preamble to
the monograph states that “micronized”
forms of titanium dioxide had been consid-
ered in establishing the monograph and thus
are covered, but the term “micronized” was
not defined.52 By defining this term and clar-
ifying the extent to which the monograph
embraces the full range of nanomaterials,
FDA would help resolve the status of one of
the more visible early products of nanotech-
nology to enter the market, thereby building
confidence that FDA is on top of its
regulatory task.
Request Cosmetic Companies to Submit
Safety Substantiation Data
FDA’s safety substantiation program for cos-
metics53 requires companies either to “ade-
quately” substantiate the safety of their ingre-
dients or to provide a label statement warn-
ing that the safety of the product has not
been determined. An increasing number of
cosmetic products are on the market bearing
nanotechnology claims or reporting formu-
lations using nanoscale ingredients, and with
52. See “Sunscreen Drug Products for Over-The-Counter Human Use; Final Monograph.” Rockville, MD: United
States Food and Drug Administration, 64 Fed. Reg. 27666, May 21, 1999.
53. See 21 CFR 740.10.
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labels that do not bear the warning state-
ment. Presumably, this means that the com-
panies have in hand or can cite “adequate”
safety substantiation data.The regulation does
not provide for FDA access to the substanti-
ation data, and FDA’s general inspection
authority does not authorize access to cos-
metic company records.
In order to better inform FDA about the
nanotechnology cosmetic products on the
market today and the basis for their safety,
FDA should request the voluntary submis-
sion of substantiation data on all products
making nanotechnology claims or containing
nanomaterials. The agency should provide
appropriate confidentiality protection for the
information. FDA should take care in formu-
lating the scope of the request, including
whether it covers all products bearing any
nanotechnology-related claim or just claims
for products whose nanomaterials satisfy
some FDA criteria, such as the criteria for
“new.” By establishing this flow of informa-
tion from the cosmetic industry, FDA will
not only be better informed but also have a
much more secure basis on which to assure
the public of the products’ safety and/or
judge whether additional regulatory tools or
initiatives are needed to inform the agency
and protect consumers.
Provide the Cosmetic Industry Guidance on
What Constitutes “Adequate” Substantiation
Cosmetic companies marketing products that
contain engineered nanomaterials do so
today without the benefit of FDA guidance
on what it takes to adequately substantiate
their safety.The scientific basis for substanti-
ating the safety of some cosmetic ingredients
is no doubt unclear and still evolving, but
because nanotechnology products are a pres-
ent reality, FDA should provide some guid-
ance on the nature of the data that should be
generated and criteria for evaluating the data.
For example, product-specific dermal pene-
tration and potential hazard tests would seem
an appropriate core data element of a sub-
stantiation package, with products found to
achieve penetration requiring further study
and evaluation.
While FDA does not currently have legal
authority to access a company’s substantia-
tion data, the provision of such guidance
would at least provide the industry with a
common starting point and could contribute
to the establishment of a de facto standard of
care for the industry. As recommended
below, the credibility of FDA’s oversight of
nanotechnology cosmetics longer term may
require giving FDA authority to review a
company’s substantiation data.
Provide Guidance on When the Use 
of Engineered Nanomaterials and 
Their Associated Claims Turn Cosmetics
into Drugs
Products that are ostensibly cosmetics but
contain ingredients that are intended to
“affect the structure or function of the body”
are drugs and must satisfy the FDC Act’s
standards for drug safety and efficacy. Some
nanotechnology cosmetics bear such claims,
for example, by stating that a product is
“bioactive” and “facilitates the increased
growth of collagen.” By providing guidance
on when the use of engineered nanomateri-
als and their associated claims make the prod-
uct a drug, FDA will be asserting its tradi-
tional regulatory authority and responsibility
for drugs and providing assurance that cos-
metic ingredients having biological impact
receive appropriate review.
Call for Data on Food Uses
As with cosmetics, FDA does not ordinarily
have access to food company records and
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safety-related data. Nevertheless, many
companies are investing in nanotechnology
research and development and presumably
developing considerable knowledge about
the safety and other properties of engi-
neered nanomaterials that would be relevant
to FDA’s regulatory and public confidence
roles. FDA should attempt to access at least
some of this information by collaborating
with industry, perhaps through a trade asso-
ciation, on a voluntary call for data on food
uses of nanotechnology. Again, FDA would
have to determine a reasonable scope for the
information requested, including the prod-
ucts covered and the nature of the informa-
tion FDA seeks, and provide appropriate
confidentiality.
By taking on these issues and reaching out
for industry information on nanotechnology
products, FDA would be playing a proper
leadership role and establishing the credibili-
ty of its regulatory oversight role.While these
actions do not require new legal authority,
they do require resources that FDA currently
lacks.Thus, in recommending these actions, I
speak as much to those who control FDA’s
budget as I do to those with regulatory
responsibilities: if gathering information and
providing guidance of the kind outlined here
are appropriate means for meeting public
expectations for oversight of nanotechnology
products, FDA should be provided the
resources to do the work.
Long-Term Legal and 
Policy Actions
Beyond immediate actions it can take under
current law, FDA’s ability over the longer term
to meet public expectations in its oversight of
nanotechnology products probably requires
some statutory change. I will outline a few
ideas in this section aimed at enhancing FDA’s
authority to be informed and provide appro-
priate pre-market and post-market oversight.
The issues that may justify legislative change
are not, however, unique to nanotechnology.
Thus, ideally, legislative change that might be
prompted by nanotechnology would be craft-
ed to enhance FDA’s ability to deal with any
emerging technology.
Importantly, however, I do not propose
changing the basic structure and approach of
the FDC Act, with its various regulatory
frameworks for different product categories
reflecting the varying degrees of oversight
judged by Congress to be appropriate for
products ranging from hand cream to cancer
drugs. In particular, though the cosmetic cat-
egory is the least intensively regulated, I do
not see a pressing need for sweeping change
to, for example, require mandatory pre-mar-
ket approval of all cosmetic ingredients. FDA
certainly needs access to cosmetic industry
safety data and some flexible new tools to deal
with new cosmetic technology, but, for most
cosmetic ingredients, the current system
appears to work reasonably well in most cases.
A final prefatory note: parties concerned
about FDA’s effectiveness should not be
afraid to seek legislation.A common reserva-
tion about the legislative route is that when
going into the process, one never knows for
sure what the outcome will be. While that
may be true enough, in our system Congress
is the sole source of FDA’s authority and
other tools for doing its job. If parties
become afraid to legislate, FDA is left with
tools that may be outdated and simply insuf-
ficient to do what the public expects, which
leaves FDA unprepared to do its job. On a
subject such as nanotechnology, the legisla-
tive system works best if parties with a com-
mon interest can come together on a com-
mon agenda. In any event, if the public wants
FDA to do its job well in a changing world,
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parties should not shy away from asking
Congress to provide the necessary tools.
As a starting point, I recommend consid-
eration of five new or expanded tools to
enhance FDA’s oversight, both pre-market
and post-market.
Call for Data Authority
One of FDA’s greatest limitations in prepar-
ing to regulate products of nanotechnology
or any rapidly emerging technology is its lack
of early, detailed, product-specific knowledge
about how the technology is being applied.
That knowledge is essential in order to pre-
pare scientifically to make decisions that are
sound from the perspective of protecting
public health and timely from the perspective
of facilitating innovation. And, without the
ability to be knowledgeable about emerging
technologies, FDA has difficulty establishing
the credibility of its oversight.
To address its need to be informed, FDA
should have administrative authority to call for
the submission of specified information on
emerging technologies and products under its
jurisdiction, including products in the develop-
ment pipeline. The legislation granting such
authority should carefully define the purposes
for which FDA may call for data and establish
criteria and a process so that the requests are
focused and targeted. Confidentiality of trade
secrets and other proprietary information must
be carefully protected.54
Discretionary Pre-Market 
Notification Authority
While I believe the basic structure of current
law works well in most cases, the effective-
ness and credibility of FDA’s oversight of
novel technologies is reduced when the sys-
tem allows for market entry without any
prior safety review by FDA. FDA lacks such
a review opportunity for cosmetics, most
dietary supplements, GRAS food ingredients
and OTC products or reformulations mar-
keted for the first time by a company.
To address this issue,FDA should be provid-
ed rule-making authority to establish interim
pre-market notification mechanisms to address
emerging and novel technologies. FDA would
have the discretion to identify product cate-
gories for which pre-market notification
would be required, the circumstances that trig-
ger notification and the data that would have
to be submitted. The goal would be to give
FDA the basis for assessing whether the prod-
uct satisfies the applicable statutory safety stan-
dard; still, such a mechanism would be a noti-
fication process, not a full pre-market approval.
If FDA believes the product does not satisfy the
safety standard, it could block marketing by
objecting to the notification.
Such mechanisms should be authorized as
interim measures, such as for a period of five
or ten years, so that FDA can effectively over-
see the introduction of the novel technology
without establishing a permanent new regula-
tory regime. During this period, FDA and
other parties could assess whether any addi-
tional oversight is needed on an ongoing basis.
Records Access
For cosmetics, most dietary supplements and
GRAS ingredients, FDA has no general
authority to examine company records relat-
ed to the safety of the product.This includes
the data underlying cosmetic safety substanti-
ations, unless based on the voluntary
Cosmetic Ingredient Review. Without such
access, FDA is constrained in its ability to
54. Precedents for FDA use of the call-for-data tool, albeit without explicit statutory authority, lie in its implemen-
tation of the OTC monograph program and the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI) program follow-
ing enactment of the 1962 drug efficacy amendments to the FDC Act.
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detect and assess possible safety issues and has
little basis for assuring the public that partic-
ular products meet applicable safety standards.
The proposed call for data and pre-market
notification tools would go a long way to
remedy this problem by giving FDA access to
the safety information on which the compa-
ny relies for marketing its products. Absent
these tools, FDA’s general inspection author-
ity for cosmetics and foods should be
expanded to allow access to safety substanti-
ation data for cosmetics and other informa-
tion in company records related to the safety
of cosmetics, foods, GRAS ingredients, food
additives and food packaging.
Post-Market Monitoring Authority
FDA’s lack of general authority to require
post-market monitoring has been high-
lighted recently by the GAO in the context
of FDA’s oversight of drug safety.The issue
has broader application, however, to the
range of circumstances involving FDA-reg-
ulated products where novel and beneficial
technologies are entering the market,
notwithstanding the inherent inability of
pre-market testing to fully assess possible
long-term effects across large populations
of consumers or patients. In these cases,
FDA should have authority to require post-
market monitoring and surveillance if
needed to assure the long-term safety of the
product. Implantable medical devices
incorporating innovative nanomaterials
provide one possible example of where
such monitoring might be justified.
The authority should be built into FDA’s
pre-market approval systems across the
board. However, the burden should be on
FDA to justify invoking it in particular
cases, and it should be invoked only for
well-defined purposes and where it will be
feasible to produce information that can
help assure the safety of the product.
Adverse Event Reporting 
Currently, FDA can mandate adverse event
reporting only for prescription drugs and med-
ical devices. Across the board, however, FDA’s
inability to know what the sponsor knows
about adverse events is an unnecessary obstacle
to FDA being able to provide effective post-
market oversight.There are many issues about
how to manage adverse event reports, and
making good use of them requires a serious
investment in staff time and information man-
agement systems. But, information about what
may have gone wrong with a product or its use
is basic to FDA’s ability to protect health and
vouch for the safety of products.
FDA should be given broad authority to
devise mandatory adverse event reporting
systems that are appropriate for each product
category and least burdensome to achieve the
legitimate oversight purpose.
Resource Needs
In general, for reasons discussed elsewhere in
this paper,Congress needs to reverse the decline
in FDA’s resource base and to rebuild FDA’s
capacity to meet the public’s expectations. In
doing so,Congress should make some provision
for FDA’s ability to respond to the challenges
posed by emerging new technologies.
Fund “Early Warning” Information
Collection 
There have been calls for many years to invest
more in maintaining and building FDA’s sci-
ence base, which includes the staff and facili-
ties to keep up with rapid scientific advances
in all quarters of FDA’s jurisdiction.Doing this
is certainly a large part of being prepared to
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regulate novel technologies. In addition, how-
ever, Congress should consider funding with-
in the Office of the Commissioner, and in
each of the operating centers, focal points for
the gathering of “scientific intelligence” to
keep FDA abreast of technological develop-
ments and to keep the agency involved in dis-
cussions occurring within the greater scientif-
ic community.While there are offices that are
tasked with this responsibility, their operating
budgets, and thus resilience to respond to new
developments, are terribly thin. Congress
should increase this funding.
Fund Regulatory Research
The burden should be on product sponsors to
test the safety of their products. FDA’s research
responsibility is to ensure that proper toxicity-
testing protocols are available and that the
agency has the scientific knowledge and tech-
nical tools, including analytical methodologies,
to play its product review and post-market
monitoring roles. FDA’s $1 million investment
in such research is noteworthy and admirable,
but it is not sufficient in light of the array of
applications of nanotechnology the agency can
expect to confront in coming years.
Build the Scientific and Regulatory Staff
Effective, science-based oversight of nanotech-
nology products—oversight that understands
the safety issues well enough to prevent prob-
lems while not unduly slowing innovation—
will require specialized scientific expertise and
focused effort by regulatory policy makers in
all of FDA’s programs. Congress should pro-
vide FDA the resources to acquire the needed
scientific expertise, so that being prepared to
oversee nanotechnology does not require
depriving other FDA programs of the scientif-
ic resources they need.
FDA also needs to add regulatory capacity
across all its programs, at both the policy-
making and field-oversight levels. Providing
scientifically sound regulatory guidance to
industry is one of the most important things
FDA can do to stay in front of any potential
safety issues posed by nanotechnology prod-
ucts. FDA needs a field force that can conduct
inspections, respond to problems and do the
other “bread-and-butter” things that are need-
ed for an effective and credible regulatory pro-
gram. In the end, FDA’s capacity to provide
timely guidance and to do these other things is
impaired by the scarcity of its resources.
Concluding Observation
Americans expect a lot of the Food and Drug
Administration. Food and cosmetics are to be
safe. Medical products are to be safe and effec-
tive. And FDA is to achieve this without
impeding technological innovation or the
prompt introduction of new products. FDA
has a long history of rising to this challenge,
never perfectly but almost always with an
earnest effort and creative use of the tools at its
disposal.This, of course, is FDA’s responsibility.
But society has a responsibility, too. Society
– citizens, businesses, and organized interest
groups – created FDA and the expectations
surrounding it. And only society, acting
through the political process, can give FDA the
tools it needs to do its job. Nanotechnology is
yet another important challenge for FDA that
brings into question whether the agency is
equipped to do what is expected.
At present, FDA is not fully equipped, in
either its legal authority or resources, which
means society has a responsibility to act – to
be clear about its expectations and to give
FDA the tools it needs to meet them. FDA
should continue its resourceful use of the
tools it has and help lead the discussion of
what more it needs to be successful, but the
rest is up to others.
60
i.This category includes all cosmetic ingredients except
color additives, which are regulated under separate
authority in a manner similar to food additives.
ii.For simplicity’s sake, this table omits FDA’s authorities
for animal drugs and therapeutic biologics, which are
regulated under separate but similar, and in some respects
overlapping, statutory provisions.
iii.This includes only cases in which, by statute or regula-
tion, FDA has established a specific requirement that a
product’s sponsor independently substantiate safety prior
to marketing but without a requirement that that sub-
stantiation be submitted to FDA.
iv. By regulation, FDA provides that cosmetic ingredients
and products “shall be adequately substantiated for safety
prior to marketing,” but provides the option, in the
absence of safety substantiation, of stating on the label:
“Warning – The safety of this product has not been
determined.”
v. Intentionally added food substances that are “generally
recognized as safe” are exempt from the definition of
food additive and from the requirement of pre-market
approval. If FDA has not formally recognized the GRAS
status of a substance, companies commonly assemble
information to demonstrate GRAS status, but there is no
legal requirement that they do so, and, in the event of a
safety concern, the burden of proof is on FDA to
demonstrate that the substance is not GRAS and thus a
food additive.
vi. FDA has established a voluntary pre-market notifica-
tion procedure for “novel foods” that has been used rou-
tinely by developers of genetically modified whole foods
to inform FDA in advance of marketing that the devel-
oper has reviewed the safety of the food and considers it
substantially equivalent to the traditional food for safety
purposes.This procedure does not involve a full FDA
safety review or result in an FDA conclusion on the safe-
ty of the product.
vii.This requirement applies only to dietary supplements
containing “new dietary ingredients,” which are defined
as those that were not marketed in the United States
prior to October 15, 1994, and only if the new dietary
ingredient has not been present in the food supply in a
chemically unaltered form. 21 USC 350b.
viii.Components of food packaging materials and other
food contact substances are “food additives” if there is a
reasonable expectation they will migrate to food, unless
they are GRAS. Rather than submitting full food
additive petitions, however, sponsors of food contact
substances have the option of submitting a pre-market
notification substantiating safety, which, if FDA does
not object, provides the legal basis for marketing the
substance.
ix. Pre-market notification is the vehicle for market entry
of medical devices that are “substantially equivalent” to a
previously marketed “predicate device” or are subject to
an FDA-promulgated performance standard.
x.This applies if FDA decides the pre-market notification
does not adequately demonstrate safety or if the sponsor
otherwise chooses to submit a food additive petition.
xi. Most OTC drugs are regulated by FDA under a
monograph system that includes FDA review of the safe-
ty and effectiveness of their active ingredients and the
issuance of regulations listing, by category of intended
OTC uses, the ingredients that can lawfully be used
based on FDA’s conclusion that they are generally recog-
nized as safe and effective for their intended uses.
Products formulated using these active ingredients and
“safe and suitable” inactive ingredients are not considered
“new drugs” and are thus not subject to the requirement
for a new drug application and the issuance of a product-
specific license as a prerequisite for marketing. 21 CFR
Part 330.
xii. New medical devices that are not substantially equiv-
alent to predicate ones and not subject to a performance
standard, or that are otherwise deemed a “Class III”
device, can be marketed only after full FDA review and
approval of that specific device product.
xiii. FDA has issued GMP regulations for foods (21 CFR
Part 110), but these are not backed up by any statutory
provision making compliance with GMPs a prerequisite
for marketing.This means that the burden remains on
FDA to prove that a product is unlawfully contaminated
or otherwise “adulterated,” not merely that it has violated
the GMP regulation.
xiv. FDA was authorized in 1994 to issue regulations
mandating GMPs for dietary supplements but has yet to
do so.
xv. For all the product categories FDA regulates, the FDC
Act authorizes FDA to go to federal court to obtain an
order seizing particular lots of product that FDA is pre-
pared to prove are in violation of the FDC Act for safety
or any other reason. FDA can also seek an injunction
barring future shipments of violative products and can
pursue criminal prosecution for violations of the FDC
Act. In criminal investigations, FDA can gain access to
safety-related records and other company-held informa-
tion if there is probable cause that the records are evi-
dence of a crime.
Table1Endnotes
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xvi.The FDC Act contains no express authority to
require post-market monitoring or testing of an
approved food additive, but FDA has on occasion elicit-
ed a sponsor’s agreement to conduct monitoring for
adverse events as a condition of approval. FDA has also
by regulation established a seldom-used procedure for
requiring additional studies on a marketed additive
when a safety question has arisen, as a condition of
continued marketing of what FDA calls an “interim”
food additive. 21 CFR Part 180.
xvii. Id.
xviii. For certain high-risk devices, FDA can, on a case-
by-case basis, require product manufacturers to conduct
“post-market surveillance” for the purpose of collecting
data that can reveal unforeseen adverse events or “other
information necessary to protect public health.”
xix. FDA can require post-market testing as a prerequi-
site for marketing in two limited situations.The first is
under the accelerated approval program, which pro-
vides for the approval of drugs for serious or life-
threatening illnesses based on surrogate end points of
effectiveness provided the sponsor conducts post-mar-
ket studies to verify safety and effectiveness. 21 CFR
Part 314, Subpart H.The second, and even more
unusual, case is when human-efficacy studies on a drug
are not ethical or feasible. 21 CFR Part 314, Subpart I.
FDA can also require post-approval testing of marketed
drugs if needed to assess the safety and effectiveness of
those drugs for use by children. 21 USC 355c(b).
xx. Sponsors of new drugs are required to report to
FDA within 15 days any adverse event coming to their
attention that is both serious and unexpected, and to
report all other adverse events on a quarterly basis. 21
USC 355(k) and 21 CFR 310.305.
xxi. FDA may inspect safety records only if it first has a
“reasonable belief ” that the food “presents a threat of
serious adverse health consequences or death.” 21 USC
350c(a).
xxii. FDA may inspect safety records only if it first has
a “reasonable belief ” that the supplement, which is by
law deemed a food,“presents a threat of serious adverse
health consequences or death.” 21 USC 350c(a).
xxiii. See note 11.
xxiv. Id.
xxv. Id.
xxvi.As a general matter, FDA inspectors can access
safety-related data on any medical device that is
“restricted” to use only on the prescription of health
practitioners or that is otherwise subject to use condi-
tions to assure its safety. 21 USC 704(a). In addition,
FDA has broad authority to require device manufactur-
ers to collect and report safety-related data, and its
inspectors have access to those data as well. 21 USC
704(e).
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